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What's Really Wrong with the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania
Bruce Ledewitz*
In the midst of criminal indictment, allegations of judicial corruption, charges of nepotism and cronyism, and disputes over secret budgets,' the question remains, aside from all that, how well
does the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania do its job? The justices
exercise their most important and independent authority in the
area of institutional relations among the branches of Pennsylvania's government. In this field, where their powers are greatest, the
justices consistently overstep reasonable boundaries of their powers. Of course, critics always say that courts are too activist. The
Pennsylvania situation is unique, however, because the justices are
not acting to protect powerless minorities or fundamental rights,
but instead, are maintaining and expanding their own influence
and prerogatives. What is really wrong with the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania is the lack of a genuine sense of judicial restraint and
modest institutional role.
The purpose of this article is to outline a series of areas in which
the court has either manifested institutional aggressiveness or the
* Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. The author acknowledges the
assistance of Carol M. Grebb in preparing this article for publication.
1. For a general summary of the recent charges and allegations swirling around the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, see the series of articles in The Pittsburgh Post Gazette.
Roger Stuart, Bill Moushey and Tim Reeves et al., The Lowdown on the High Court, PGH.
POST GAZETTE, October 10-14, 1993. Some of these issues came to a head recently with the
indictment of Justice Rolf Larsen on 27 counts of illegally obtaining prescription drugs. See
PGH. POST GAZETTE, October 29, 1993. As this article was written, the Judiciary Committee
of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives was considering beginning impeachment proceedings against Justice Larsen.
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court has failed to carry out its responsibilities. The first section
delineates the court's claims over supervision of the legal profession and rulemaking. Here the court asserts unwarranted judicial
supremacy. Part II sets forth the court's approach to justiciability,
particularly in the state constitutional realm. Here, the court is
willing to decide issues that should not be heard. Part III describes
two lines of cases-labor relations and taxes-in which the court's
view of desirable policy has come to dominate adjudication. Here
the court is willing to supersede legislative policy preferences. Part
IV reviews the court's strained state constitutional decisions that
have the effect of favoring the justices' personal interests. Finally,
Part V describes the court's approaches to three important state
constitutional issues and finds a fundamental lack of coherence.
What is missing in these areas is a willingness on the part of the
justices to subordinate themselves: In the area of policy, to
subordinate their views in favor of those of the legislature; in the
area of self-interest, to subordinate their needs to the appearance
of propriety; and in the area of doctrinal development, to
subordinate their approaches to those of prior case law. Perhaps
the recent difficulties of the court will help the justices develop a
sense of a more restrained role.
I.

ARTICLE V, SECTION 10 POWERS

In 1968, the Pennsylvania Constitution was rewritten to grant to
the supreme court extensive administrative, supervisory and
rulemaking powers.2 Since that time, the court has expanded these
2. PA. CONST. art. V, §§ 10(a) & 10(c). The Pennsylvania Constitution now provides:
Section 10. (a) The Supreme Court shall exercise general supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts and justices of the peace, including authority to
temporarily assign judges and justices of the peace from one court or district to another as it deems appropriate.
(c) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing
practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts, justices of the peace and all officers
serving process or enforcing orders, judgments or decrees of any court or justice of the
peace, including the power to provide for assignment and reassignment of classes of
actions or classes of appeals among the several courts as the needs of justice shall
require, and for admission to the bar and to practice law, and the administration of
all courts and supervision of all officers of the judicial branch, if such rules are consistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant, nor affect the right of the General Assembly to determine the
jurisdiction of any court or justice of the peace, nor suspend nor alter any statute of
limitation or repose. All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these provisions.
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grants through broad interpretation of its powers under article V.
A.

Inherent Powers

The justices on the supreme court have suggested that they possess certain powers by virtue of the existence of the court, without
regard to the constitutional text. This attitude was illustrated
under the current constitution at the time the 1968 amendments,
including article V, were adopted. In Stander v. Kelley,' the validity of the limited constitutional convention that rewrote article V
was challenged. 4 Justice Roberts, in his concurrence, responded to
the allegation that the language in section 2(c) of article V-that
the supreme court "shall have such jurisdiction as shall be provided by law""-eliminated the court's King's Bench power,' un-7
less the legislature chose to invest the court with that authority.
Justice Roberts concluded that the phrase in question did not have
the King's Bench power to legislative defithe effect of subjecting
8
control.
nition and
Justice Roberts failed to consider that the argument's premise
was flawed. The plaintiffs were suggesting that if the new article V
had curtailed the King's Bench power, or some other aspect of the
court's jurisdiction, such curtailment would be unconstitutional.
But it is article V that defines the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. It makes no sense to suggest that article V could
itself be unconstitutional.
In a system based on law, the notion that the court must have
powers other than those included in the constitution is a strange
3. 250 A.2d 474 (Pa. 1969).
4. Stander, 250 A.2d at 479-80. Justice Roberts was joined by Justices Jones and
Pomeroy. Id. at 485-87.
5. PA. CONST. art V, § 2(c).
6. The powers of the King's Bench refer to the supreme court's authority to intervene and review proceedings in inferior courts at any stage of litigation. The authority first
appears to have been asserted in In re Pollard, 17 A. 1087 (Pa. 1889). The authority is
codified as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Supreme Court may, on its own motion or upon petition of any party, in any matter pending before any court or district
justice of this Commonwealth involving an issue of immediate public importance, assume plenary jurisdiction of such matter at any stage thereof and enter a final order
or otherwise cause right and justice to be done;
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN, § 726 (1981).
Of course, the point of the discussion in Stander was the assertion that the King's Bench
authority is not premised on statutory authorization, but is inherent.
7. Stander, 250 A.2d at 486-87.
8. Id. at 487 (Roberts, J., concurring).

412

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 32:409

one. Where would such powers come from? To put the matter in
federal perspective, although writers have suggested that congressional limits on United States Supreme Court jurisdiction might be
unconstitutional,9 no one has ever suggested that if Article III of
the federal constitution allowed such restrictions, Article III itself
might be unconstitutional. 10
The implied view of Justices Roberts, Jones and Pomeroy is not
an isolated one. Recently, in Lavelle v. Koch" and Snyder v. Snyder,12 the court reaffirmed its "inherent power" to compel expenditures necessary to fund the courts.' 3 The most candid statement of
the doctrine of inherent powers is contained in the Pennsylvania
Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement-the enforcement mechanism
for the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 103 of the Rules of
Disciplinary Enforcement provides as follows:
The Supreme Court declares that it has inherent and exclusive power to
supervise the conduct of attorneys who are its officers (which power is reasserted in Section 10(c) of Article V of the Constitution
of Pennsylvania) and
14
in furtherance thereof promulgates these rules.

Does this language mean that the people of Pennsylvania are
powerless to remove attorney discipline and legal ethics from the
control of the court, even if the citizens rewrite the constitution?
Considering that this same court voted only 3-2 to protect the lawyers who supervise judicial discipline from being subjected to disciplinary enforcement,15 a desire by the public to remove attorney
discipline from the court is a real possibility. There is no doubt
that despite the language of rule 103, the voters are free to accomplish this result. It would be better, however, if the justices removed this exaggerated language from rule 103. The doctrine of
inherent judicial power has no place in a legal system ruled by
law.16
9. See, e.g., Lawrence Sager, ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress' Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981).

10. In Commonwealth v. Carsia, 517 A.2d 956 (Pa. 1986), a unanimous court read a
similar phrase-"shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be imposed by
law"-as creating legislative control over the duties of the Pennsylvania Attorney General
without suggesting that such control raised separation-of-powers issues. Carsia,517 A.2d at
959.
11.

617 A.2d 319 (Pa. 1992).

12. 620 A.2d 1133 (Pa. 1993).
13. Lavelle, 617 A.2d at 321; Snyder, 620 A.2d at 1136.
14.

PA. R. Discp. ENF. 103.

15. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick, 555 A.2d 883 (Pa. 1989).
16. For another example of the idea of inherent judicial authority, see Commonwealth v. Parrish, 528 A.2d 151, 154-55 (Pa. 1987) (Larsen, J., dissenting) (inherent jurisdic-
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Rulemaking Power

The language of article V, section 10(c) grants to the supreme
court "the power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts . .
".., The authority of such
rules is superior even to that of the General Assembly: "All laws
shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with
rules prescribed under these provisions.""8
The court's use of the rulemaking power has led to four serious
problems. The court has expanded what is a broad power to begin
with, by its broad interpretation. The court has substituted
rulemaking for constitutional interpretation. The court has never
developed fair and consistent procedures for rulemaking. And, the
court has allowed rulemaking to lead to conflict with the Executive
Power.
While the procedural rulemaking power is broad, the justices
have expanded that power by their broad understanding of when a
rule and a law are "inconsistent." In Commonwealth v. Sorrell,1 9
the court determined that section 5104(c) of title 42 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, which granted an absolute right to
the commonwealth to demand a jury trial in a criminal case, conflicted with rule 1101 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which gave discretion to the trial judge to decide whether to
accept a defendant's waiver of a jury trial.20 In effect, section
5104(c), as written, prevented a criminal defendant from obtaining
a court trial unless the district attorney agreed.
Justice Roberts' majority opinion described section 5104(c) as
"inconsistent" with rule 1101 and thus "suspended" by operation
of article V, section 10(c). 21 This "inconsistency" did not consist of
the physical or logical impossibility of complying with both rule
and statute. A trial judge could satisfy both section 5104(c) and
rule 1101. To ensure accommodation, the court could have instructed trial judges that waivers of juries ordinarily should not be
granted against the expressed wishes of the district attorney. In
that way, actual conflicts between statute and rule would rarely
arise and could be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
tion of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to review superior court ruling despite contrary legislative mandate).
17. PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c). See note 2 for applicable text.
18. Id.
19. 456 A.2d 1326 (Pa. 1982).
20. Sorrell, 456 A.2d at 1328-29.
21. Id. at 1329.
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What the justices did, instead, was to approach inconsistency as
if the issue were analogous to preemption of state law by Congress.
The justices assumed that the field of jury waiver had been occupied by the rules of procedure, leaving no room for the legislature
to supplement regulation of the area by legislation.2 2
When considering inconsistency, as in so many institutional issues, the question turns on the amount of deference the court will
grant to the legislature. Ordinarily, we expect courts to defer to the
legislature in the absence of a constitutional violation. There is no
such violation in section 5104(c)'s requirement of criminal jury trials. Unless the constitutional text is read as granting exclusive
rulemaking power to the court, legislative policy initiative is not
absolutely forbidden. What was involved in Sorrell was a legislative view of policy, something normally left to the legislature.
Is Sorrell then premised implicitly on the view of the justices
that the rulemaking power is exclusive? The justices did describe
the rulemaking power as "exclusive" in In re 42 Pa.C.S. § 1703.23
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has gone so far as to say of
Pennsylvania that the legislature "is without power to control procedure. ' 24 And, in Sorrell itself, the statute was struck down after
a determination that the matter legislated was procedural in
nature.2 5
Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine the court pursuing consistently an either/or approach to the procedure/substance distinction.
For one thing, the procedure/substance distinction has elsewhere
proved unworkable2 ' and has no inherent appeal. Additionally,
the text of section 10(c) does not support an exclusive power. If the
text were interpreted as meaning that all procedural legislation is
invalid, why would the text mandate that only "inconsistent" legislation be suspended?
The court does not seem committed to exclusivity. Sorrell was
decided in the context of a purported conflict between statute and
22. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (preemption of Pennsylvania's
sedition law by pervasive federal sedition legislation).
23. 394 A.2d 444, 448 (Pa. 1978) [hereinafter In re § 1703].
24. Garrett v. Bamford, 582 F.2d 810, 814 (3d Cir. 1978).
25. Sorrell, 456 A.2d at 1329.
26. Compare Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), in which the Court, to
resolve issues of the application of state law in federal diversity cases "put[s] to one side
abstraction regarding 'substance' and 'procedure.'" Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109.
27. See generally, Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure"-in the Rules
Enabling Act, 1989 DuKE L. J. 281 (1989) (substance and procedure can be understood only
by reference to the purpose of making the distinction).
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rule. In the context of judicial silence, however, the justices have
not searched every legislative act to inquire whether the statute in
question regulates procedure. Many statutes regulate procedure-the death penalty statute2 and the Mental Health Procedures Act,29 for example-and have not been overturned on that
basis.30
In at least one instance the court has appeared to acknowledge
that the legislature has authority concurrent with the rulemaking
power to regulate procedure. In In re John Doe CorporationsA, B,
C, D and E,3 1 the court held that the statutory provision governing
enforcement of Pennsylvania Crime Commission subpoenas violated due process for failure to provide a pre-enforcement hearing
on the substance of the subpoena.32 Rather than strike the commission's enforcement power, however, Justice Hutchinson, exercising authority "under Article V, Section 10(c)," suspended the
statutory provision at issue and "adopt[ed]" section 520 of the Administrative Code, a statutory section governing enforcement of
other administrative subpoenas, "pending further appropriate action by the Legislature, or this Court .

. . ."

If the rulemaking

were truly exclusive, section 520 itself would presumably be unconstitutional and there could be no suggestion that the legislature
could provide a new mechanism in the future.
The justices are apparently committed to the position that in
cases involving procedural disputes, the court's policy will prevail.
Though the court specifically said in In re § 1703 that its powers
were exclusive,3 4 such an approach would quickly prove unmanageable were the justices to attempt to apply it. One is thus left with
the view that the legislature is free to legislate in the procedural
realm. But, if this is the case, the court should interpret inconsistency quite narrowly, so that the normal presumption of legislative
constitutionality applies.
The court has also expanded the procedural rulemaking power
by applying it as a substitute for constitutional interpretation.
This tendency is illustrated in the interaction of Commonwealth v.
28. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (1990 & Supp. 1993).
29. 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7101-7503 (Supp. 1993).
30. See Commonwealth v. DeHart, 516 A.2d 656 (Pa. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S.
1010 (1987) (death penalty statute does not violate court's rulemaking power).
31. 489 A.2d 182 (Pa. 1985).
32. In re John Doe Corps., 489 A.2d at 184.
33. Id. at 184-85.
34. In re § 1703, 394 A.2d at 448.
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Milliken,"5 and rule 2003 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure. In Milliken, the court held that article I, section 8 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution does not require that all facts relied
upon to establish probable cause for a search warrant be reduced
to writing. 6 Nevertheless, because judicial review of the issuance
of the warrant can be difficult without a written record, Justice
Roberts' majority opinion exercised the court's "supervisory powers" to formulate a prospective "procedural" rule mandating a contemporary written record."7 Later, presumably pursuant to this supervisory power and the rulemaking power, the court adopted rule
2003,8 which explicitly requires that probable cause for search
warrants be based upon information contained within the four corners of the written affidavit.3 9
The policy contained in rule 2003-that search warrants be supported by writing-is certainly defensible. Indeed, Justices
Manderino and Pomeroy would have held that this is required by
article I, section 8.40 But assuming, as the justices held, that there
is no requirement of writing in article I, section 8 of the constitution, the question becomes, did the justices have authority to add
this requirement? Like other prophylactic rules of criminal, procedure, the "four-corners" requirement can act to frustrate law enforcement and free the guilty. 41 While section 10 does not expressly state the limits of the supervisory and rulemaking powers,
the examples listed, assignment of judges and causes of actions, are
housekeeping measures. There is no hint in section 10 that important matters of policy are to be decided by virtue of the rulemaking power. If not of constitutional dimension, such decisions should
35. 300 A.2d 78 (Pa. 1973).
36. Milliken, 300 A.2d at 81.
37. Id.
38.

PA. R. CRIM. P. 2003.

39. PA. R. CRIM. P. 2003 (a)(b). Rule 2003 provides in relevant part:
(a) No search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by one or more
affidavits sworn to before the issuing authority. The issuing authority, in determining
whether probable cause has been established, may not consider any evidence outside
the*affidavits.
(b) At any hearing on a motion for the return or suppression of evidence, or for suppression of the fruits of evidence, obtained pursuant to a search warrant, no evidence
shall be admissible to establish probable cause other than the affidavits provided for
in paragraph (a).
Id.
40. Milliken, 300 A.2d at 83 (Manderino, J., dissenting) and at 85 n.2 (Pomeroy, J.,
dissenting).
41. Cf. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 906 (Pa. 1991) (Papadakos, J.,
concurring) (Rule 2003 requires the "outrage" of reversal of conviction).
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be left to the legislature or to the people.
In at least one instance, the people of Pennsylvania have reversed a judicial action that they felt had enhanced the rights of
the accused to too great a degree. In November 1984, the voters of
Pennsylvania adopted an amendment to article I, section 9 that
provides that"[t]he use of a suppressed voluntary admission or voluntary confession to impeach the credibility of a person may. be
permitted and shall not be construed as compelling a person to
give evidence against himself."4 The purpose of this amendment
was to overturn the result in Commonwealth v. Triplett,4' which
rejected the federal rule announced in Harris v. New York " and
held that statements of a defendant inadmissible for any reason-including violation of Miranda rights-could not be used to
impeach the defendant on cross examination.' 5 The amendment
applied the contrary federal rule as a matter of state constitutional
law.
Whatever one thinks of the amendment and whatever one thinks
in general of popular initiatives overturning judicial decisions, no
one can doubt that this amendment was within the legal prerogatives of the voters. Would the justices now be free to ignore this
amendment by the device of adopting a rule of procedure setting
forth the Triplett restriction on cross examination? While one
could argue that such a rule would enlarge the substantive rights
of criminal defendants and, hence, would be constitutionally invalid," the same argument could be made about the requirements of
a written record for valid warrants. Ironically, if the justices had
ruled in Milliken that the "four-corners" requirement were a mat42. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9. As amended, article I, section 9 provides:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard by himself and his
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to meet the
witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and, in prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage; he cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor
can he be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers
or the law of the land. The use of a suppressed voluntary admission or voluntary
confession to impeach the credibility of a person may be permitted and shall not be
construed as compelling a person to give evidence against himself.
Id.
43. 341 A.2d 62 (Pa. 1975).
44. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
45. Triplett, 341 A.2d at 64. See generally, Bruce Ledewitz, Confession Law Isn't
Necessary, 8 PA. LAW J. REP., No. 1 (Jan. 7, 1985) at 1.
46. Article V, section 10(c) allows the court to adopt only rules of procedure that do
not "abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant." PA. CONST. art. V,
§ 10(c).
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ter of state constitutional interpretation, the voters would be free
to amend the "four corners" requirement. There is, however, no
mechanism for popular override of a rule of procedure.
The better practice for the court under the current rulemaking
system would be to adopt rules of procedure that are non-controversial housekeeping measures. This standard already describes
most of the content of Pennsylvania's current rules. In the long
run, Pennsylvania should subject the rule-making power to legislative oversight.
A third way in which the rulemaking power is used inappropriately is the justices' failure to maintain fair and consistent procedures in rulemaking. Rulemaking is a form of legislation. Like all
decisionmaking, rulemaking should be done primarily in open session. But in In re § 1703"7 the justices struck down an attempt by
the legislature to subject judicial rulemaking to the Pennsylvania
Open Meeting Law."
One can sympathize with the justices' position in In re § 1703
that in carrying out core constitutional functions, each branch of
government is to be free of interference by the other branches.
Rulemaking is, after all, defined by article V, section 10 as such a
core function. But even if section 1703 were regarded as unconstitutional, the court was free to adopt its policy of openness nevertheless, as an appropriate manner in which to carry out the court's
responsibility. Nothing prevents the justices from deferring to the
4e
legislature's policy.
Another aspect of fair and consistent rulemaking is the existence
of a formal method for the rulemaking power to be invoked. Rule
103 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration actually
sets up formal rulemaking procedures. 50 But in In re John Doe
5 1
Corporations,
Justice Hutchinson simply announced that the
court would "exercise its power under Article V, Section 10(c) of
our Pennsylvania Constitution to prescribe such judicial procedures as are necessary for the enforcement of [Commission subpoe47. 394 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1978). See note 23 and accompanying text.
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 261 (Supp. 1993), repealed by the Sunshine Act, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 271 (Supp. 1993).
49. Cf. Kremer v. State Ethics Comm'n., 469 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1983) (Larsen, J., concurring), Justice Larsen stated, "now that the matter has been judicially concluded, this court
should proceed to promulgate appropriate rules to provide for financial disclosure by members of the judiciary." Kremer, 469 A.2d at 596.
50. PA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 103.
51. 489 A.2d 182 (Pa. 1985).
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nas]," which the court then did in the opinion.52
In another instance of breach of formal process, the justices
have, in effect, twice struck down statutes pursuant to their
-rulemaking power without advance warning and without affording
the commonwealth an opportunity to respond. In announcing that
the Open Meeting Law could not be applied to the court as a legislated mandate, the justices literally wrote a letter to the Governor,
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House." This
is a pretty strange way for a court to do business, reminiscent in
form of the Correspondence of the Justices in 1793, refusing to answer certain questions put to the Justices by President Washington.5" But the Justices of the United States Supreme Court refused
to answer the questions put to them. In contrast, the justices of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania opined-held?-that section 1703
was unconstitutional.
Not only was the form of the decision perhaps an advisory opinion, but the format gave no opportunity for an adverse party to be
heard. Of course, the justices had already decided that section 1703
was unconstitutional. But, unless the justices believe that no one
outside the court can have anything to say on issues of the separation of powers, they should have awaited the very event they described in their letter-a lawsuit challenging rules adopted without
conforming to the new statute.5 5 Perhaps such a lawsuit would
never have been brought. In that event, no constitutional decision
would have been needed. Perhaps the plaintiffs' brief would have
convinced the court. In either event, the result could have changed.
Another example of an abrupt invocation of the rulemaking
power occurred in regard to section 8355 of title 42 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes.5 6 Section 8355 provided that if a
pleading or motion is signed by an attorney or party in "bad
faith," the opposing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable
attorney fees and the unsuccessful attorney may be liable to a civil
penalty of up to $10,000. 5"
In response to section 8355, the justices amended rule 1451 of
52. In re John Doe Corp., 489 A.2d at 185. In contrast, the court in Commonwealth v.
Milliken, 300 A.2d 78, 81 (Pa. 1973), announced that it would adopt governing rules in the
future.
53. In re § 1703, 394 A.2d 444.
54. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 64-66
(2d ed. 1973).
55. In re § 1703, 394 A.2d at 446.
56. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8355 (1990 & Supp. 1993).
57. Id.
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the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure," thus suspending the
statute before its effective date. In addition, presumably because
the usual procedures under section 103(a)(3) of the Rules of Judicial Administration would have taken too long, the order suspending the statute was immediately promulgated "in the interest
of justice and efficient administration."5 9
Thus, not only did the court suspend a statute without ever seeing it in action, the justices also acted without giving to the commonwealth any notice of their intentions. The commonwealth
never had a chance to respond to this challenge to its statute.6 0
Nor was the court forced to explain its rationale, as at least it did
in its letter concerning section 1703.6'
The final concern about the rulemaking power is conflict between the rules and Executive Branch discretion. The justices have
recently suggested that their rulemaking power is superior to concepts of constitutionally protected prosecutorial discretion. In
Commonwealth v. Lutz, 2 the court upheld prosecutorial discretion
not to move for the admission of criminal defendants into Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition in drunk driving cases.63 This discretion, however, was not premised on any concept of executive
power. Justice Flaherty's majority opinion emphasized that such
decisions were made "under the rules [of ARD disposition]
promulgated by this court . ...
"'6 In Commonwealth v. Benz, 65
Chief Justice Nix held for a three-justice plurality that, pursuant
to rule 133 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
prosecutorial decision not to prosecute because of the lack of a
prima facie case is reviewable in the courts.6 6 Justice Larsen, concurring in the result, would have held that prosecutorial discretion
58. PA. R. Civ. P. 1451 (rescinded 1991).
59. Id.
60. Compare Lloyd v. Fishinger, 552 A.2d 303 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), in which the
superior court struck down 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7101, which governed fee arrangements,
pursuant to a normal lawsuit. Note that the decision was affirmed by an equally divided
supreme court. Lloyd v. Fishinger, 605 A.2d 1193 (Pa. 1992).
61. In re § 1703, 394 A.2d 444.
62. 495 A.2d 928 (Pa. 1985).
63. Lutz, 495 A.2d at 935.
64. Id. at 932. Justice Nix's dissent, joined by Justice Zappala, would have restricted
prosecutorial discretion. Id. at 936.
65. 565 A.2d 764 (Pa. 1989).
66. Benz, 565 A.2d at 768. Chief Justice Nix would have deferred to prosecutorial
discretion if the reason for not prosecuting had been related to policy concerns. Id. at 767
n.4.
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is always reviewable6 1 Justices Papadakos and McDermott would
have subjected prosecutorial discretion to judicial review only at
the trial court level 6 8 Thus, all of the justices in these cases were
willing, at least to some extent, to subordinate the exercise of executive authority to the rulemaking power.
C.

Supervisory Power

Although related to the rulemaking power and sometimes utilized interchangeably with it,6 9 the supervisory power of the court
is separate from rulemaking. Article V, section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution grants to the court "general supervisory and administrative authority" over the courts in subsection (a).70 In subsection (c), the court is granted the "power to prescribe general
rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts
• . . and. . . for admission to the bar and to practice law, and the
supervision of all officers of the Judicial Branch . ...
The important distinction between subsections (a) and (c) is
that only the rulemaking power is accorded hierarchical authority
over inconsistent legislation. The general power to supervise is not
given such weight. Nor does the general supervisory power extend
to the conduct of attorneys. These differences undermine the persuasiveness of a line of cases placing exclusive authority in the supreme court to regulate the conduct of judges, court personnel and
attorneys.
This line of cases originated with Wajert v. State Ethics Commission.7 2 In Wajert, the justices held unanimously that the State
Ethics Act was unconstitutional insofar as it purported to prohibit
a retired common pleas judge from representing clients in that
court within the first year of the judge's retirement.7 8 The statute
was unconstitutional because it infringed "the Supreme Court's inherent and exclusive power to govern the Conduct of those privi74
leged to practice law in this Commonwealth.
Wajert is a very broad holding in three respects. First, there is
no inconsistent rule of procedure under which the Ethics Act could
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 769 (Larsen, J., concurring).
Id. at 770 (Papadakos, J., joined by McDermott, J., dissenting).
See Milliken, 300 A.2d 78 (Pa. 1973); see notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 10. See note 2 for applicable text.
Id.
420 A.2d 439 (Pa. 1980).
Wajert, 420 A.2d at 442.
Id.
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be suspended. There are only rules of ethics that generally govern
appearances of impropriety. In addition, there was a provision in
the Code of Professional Responsibility that prohibited a lawyer
from accepting representation in a matter in which he had acted in
a judicial capacity.7 5 But the Ethics Act was not "inconsistent"
with that provision and the opinion did not hold that it was. The
constitutional basis of the opinion was that governing attorney
76
conduct is an exclusive power of the court.
The second aspect of Wajert's breadth is that it appears to prohibit legislative regulation not only of judges and court personnel,
but also of any aspect of attorney conduct or admission to the bar.
Indeed the court emphasizes the decision's potential in a footnote.77 Under this approach, the court could rule that attorneys are
not subject to criminal prosecution for acts undertaken pursuant
to client representation.
Finally, this exclusive supervisory power is not tied to the constitutional text, but is referred to as an "inherent power.''78 Perhaps
this reliance was necessitated by the absence of textual support for
a claim of exclusive supervisory power. Subsection (a) does not
suggest such exclusivity; nor does the supervisory power it enumerates go beyond simple administrative matters. Subsection (c) does
grant a rulemaking power, but does not suspend statutes in the
absence of inconsistency. Wajert, then, amounts to an unsupported assertion of supreme judicial authority.
Wajert has proved an enduring precedent. In Kremer v. State
Ethics Commission,7 9 the court held that subjecting judges to financial disclosure requirements would violate the court's "power to
supervise courts." 80 In Snyder v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review,8 1 a plurality opinion held that a statute permitting partisan political activity is suspended insofar as it applies to
any person who is governed by a state supreme court directive for3
bidding such activity.82 In Maunus v. State Ethics Commission,"
the court upheld the application of financial disclosure requirements to attorneys employed by the commonwealth. But the
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

Wajert, 420 A.2d at 442.
Id. at 442 n.5.
Id. at 442.
469 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1983).
Kremer, 469 A.2d at 595.
502 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 1985).
Snyder, 502 A.2d at 1234.
544 A.2d 1324 (Pa. 1988).

DR 9-101 (A) (1980).
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ground of decision for Chief Justice Nix was not the power of the
government to regulate attorneys, which is specifically reaffirmed
as exclusive to the court in Maunus, but the authority of an employer to prescribe reasonable regulations for an employee.84 In
Lloyd v. Fishinger,6 an equally divided court affirmed a superior
court decision that title 42, section 7101(a)(3) of the Pennsylvania
Consolidated Statutes, prohibiting fee arrangements during the
first fifteen days of confinement in a hospital or sanitarium, violated the court's supervisory power. 6
On the strength of Maunus and the fragmented decision in
Lloyd, one might assume that the court is weakening in its commitment to exclusive supervision. However, the suspension of title
42, section 8355 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes without
comment and without dissent 8 suggests that Wajert currently remains the foundation of judicial analysis of separation-of-powers
issues affecting the legal community in Pennsylvania.
II.

JUSTICIABILITY

In his concurrence in United States v. Richardson,88 Justice
Powell made the point that "[relaxation of standing requirements
is directly related to the expansion of judicial power." 89 The same
could be said of any large-scale increase in the availability of a judicial forum to resolve controversial issues. In recent years, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has lowered restrictions on access to
the state courts. The court has done this, moreover, in cases that
do not raise issues of individual liberty but concern divisions of
power among governmental units. The result has been to enhance
the role of the court in Pennsylvania's public life.
A. Standing
With little fanfare, the court has moved dramatically to the establishment of citizen standing to challenge broad and general assertions of illegal government conduct. This expansion may be said
to have begun, ironically, with a case that narrowed the previously
liberal approach to taxpayer standing, In re Application of
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Maunus, 544 A.2d at 1326-27.
605 A.2d 1193 (Pa. 1992).
Lloyd, 605 A.2d at 1193.
PA. R. Civ. P. 1451, see notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
418 U.S. 166 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 188.
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Biester9 0 In Biester, the court held that the prevention of a waste
of tax revenue is insufficient to grant standing because it is an interest held in common with all other taxpayers.91 All citizens have
an interest in having others comply with the law, but standing requires more than that."
But the court qualified this general restriction with a "policy"
exception so potentially broad that it threatens to undermine the
general restriction. Taxpayer standing can still be granted "to ensure judicial review which would otherwise not occur."93 An illustration of this principle is said to occur when those immediately
affected are benefitted by the alleged illegality. 9 ' Obviously, such
persons will not sue.
This point of view-that there must be someone who can sue
about a matter of alleged government illegality-stands in total
contrast to the view of a majority of justices on the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Richardson:95
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no
one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual
or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to
the political process. Any other conclusion would mean that the Founding
Fathers intended to set up something in the nature of an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the National
Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts."

There is nothing illegitimate, of course, about a state court disagreeing with the United States Supreme Court. Standing and the
role of courts are certainly state constitutional issues. Nor is there
anything wrong with disagreeing with the United States Supreme
Court without acknowledging the difference in viewpoint. What is
surprising, however, is for a state court to ignore the United States
Supreme Court's view on what anyone would say is an important
issue of judicial restraint and then to adopt the opposite conclusion, without justification or discussion, as if the view adopted
were a self-evident proposition.
To be fair, in Biester the justices concluded that standing did
not exist in that case and so perhaps attention was not drawn to
90. 409 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1979).
91. Biester, 409 A.2d at 851-52.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 852.

94. Id.
95.

418 U.S. 166 (1974).

96. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
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the parameters of this described exception. But in Consumer Party
of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth97 and Sprague v. Casey,98 the
policy exception grew to engulf whatever limits on standing the Biester court had in mind.
In Consumer Party, the justices applied the exception they had
only described in Biester. Consumer Party involved the attempt
by that political party and other "citizen-taxpayers," as the court
described them, to challenge the constitutionality of a pay raise
the legislaturehad passed. 9 Chief Justice Nix's opinion noted that
the context was one in which judicial review would otherwise be
impossible because those immediately affected-the recipients of
the pay increase-were benefitted by the alleged illegality.10 0 The
opinion also raised the policy ground of this exception-"add[ing]
to the controls over public officials"-to a more prominent position
in the text 01 than it had held in Biester.'°2 Consumer Party created a list of five factors, which, if satisfied, automatically grant
taxpayer standing.'0 3
In Consumer Party, the availability of the policy exception was
potentially expanded to a wide variety of cases. Nevertheless, the
context of Consumer Party was still illegal government spending,
rather than illegal government action in general. In Sprague v.
04 that distinction
Casey,1
was seemingly breached without comment. In Sprague, a "taxpayer" was permitted to challenge the
scheduled date of judicial elections on the ground that the elec97. 507 A.2d 323 (Pa. 1986).
98. 550 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1988).
99. Consumer Party, 507 A.2d at 325.
100. Id. at 329.
101. Id. at 328 (quoting Biester, 409 A.2d at 851 n.5).
102. In Biester, the only reference to this justification was in a footnote, which quoted
a Yale Law Journal casenote. Biester, 409 A.2d at 851 n.5.
103. Consumer Party, 507 A.2d at 329. Chief Justice Nix said:
To summarize, in Biester we held that a taxpayer seeking standing to sue must allege
a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the suit unless the
taxpayer can show:
1. the governmental action would otherwise go unchallenged;
2. those directly and immediately affected by the complained of expenditures
are beneficially affected and not inclined to challenge the action;
3. judicial relief is appropriate;
4. redress through other channels is unavailable; and
5. no other persons are better situated to assert the claim.
Id.
Although Chief Justice Nix refers to Biester in formulating this list, it is Consumer Party
that organizes these factors.
104. 550 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1988).
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tions were not scheduled in the year prescribed by the state constitution.10 5 Chief Justice Nix found standing based on the exception
in Biester that had been applied in Consumer Party.0 6 Although
Chief Justice Nix did not refer to the list of factors he had set
forth in Consumer Party, he did refer to the factors in a general
way and found that they were met.'0 7
What Chief Justice Nix failed to note in Sprague is that unlike
Consumer Party, Sprague involved illegal expenditures only in the
sense that all government action costs something. In fact, canceling
the election in September probably cost more than holding it as
scheduled. Thus, Sprague breaks any connection between taxpayer
standing and spending. In effect, Sprague establishes citizen
standing in any case alleging a constitutional violation that would
otherwise go unlitigated.
It is not the purpose of this article to criticize the particular reasoning of any of these cases. This author's criticism is that the
court has, in many different cases, expanded the parameters of its
role. Certainly that is the case in recognizing broad citizen standing. But, having said this, such broad citizen standing is certainly a
dubious proposition on its own merits. Will the court then hear a
suit brought by a citizen when a school district allows Christmas
songs and all the parents and students in the district support it?
Will the court then hear next friend petitions whenever a condemned prisoner drops all further litigation? ' "s The logic of
Sprague promotes such review. In effect, the court has invited litigation in these and other contexts.
B.

Political Question

The unwillingness of the court to characterize the claim in Allegheny County v. Commonwealth"9 as a nonjusticiable political
105. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 187.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See generally, Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (death row inmate did
not have standing in his individual capacity or as "next friend" to litigate whether Eighth
Amendment requires an automatic direct appeal in a capital case where the defendant had
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his conviction and death
sentence).
109. 534 A.2d 760 (Pa. 1987). In Allegheny County, the court refers to "non-justiciability," but not to the "political question" doctrine. Nevertheless, as the court notes, all
of the formulations of nonjusticiability are based on Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
which itself characterized the justiciability issue as the reach of the political question doctrine. Allegheny County, 534 A.2d at 762.
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question has led to public embarrassment for the court. The case
involved a challenge by the county of the statutory obligation to
fund certain aspects of the operation of the courts of common
pleas. 110 The en banc commonwealth court, citing Baker v. Carr,"'
held that the case was nonjusticiable and dismissed the complaint.11 2 The commonwealth court viewed the issue in the case-court funding--as textually committed to the legislative branch and
considered it impossible to create an appropriate judicial remedy. 1 ' The supreme court reversed, holding that the legislature's
funding power is subject to constitutional restraint and, by implication, if the obligation to fund the local courts were found to rest
in the legislature, the court would simply so order. 1 4
There is a sense that the commonwealth court was disingenuous
in holding the case to be nonjusticiable. The dismissive tone of the
opinion and the holding that the 1968 amendment to article V did
not affect the commonwealth's funding obligation" 5 clearly suggest
that the court thought the county was wrong in its claim on the
merits. Nor is there any formal difficulty in ordering relief. If the
commonwealth owes a sum of money, it is not usually thought "impossible" to order that the money be paid.
The real issue in the case and the reason a remedy could not be
created was obviously that any order would be disobeyed. As estimated in Chief Justice Nix's dissent, the effect of the order in Allegheny County was to require the legislature to come up with an
additional $239,000,000 for local court funding." 6 An amount that
large would be hard to squeeze out of the existing state budget.
Certainly the state legislature was not going to raise taxes to comply with the court's conclusion. What the commonwealth court apparently feared is precisely what has occurred. The supreme
court's mandate has been ignored. 7
110. Allegheny County, 534 A.2d at 761. Allegheny County also argued that counties
in Pennsylvania actually are not bound to fund the courts, but this view was rejected. Id. at
761, 765.
111. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
112. Allegheny County v. Commonwealth Court, 500 A.2d 1267, 1268 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1985).
113. Allegheny County, 500 A.2d at 1269.
114. Allegheny County, 534 A.2d at 765.
115. Allegheny County, 500 A.2d at 1270.
116. Allegheny County, 534 A.2d at 768 n.3 (Nix, J, dissenting).
117. The seemingly political context of the decision did not help acceptance of the
decision. The four justices who voted with the county-Justices Flaherty, Larsen, Zappala
and Papadakos-are all from Allegheny County and could not have been elected without
Democratic Party support. Chief Justice Nix and Justice McDermott dissented. Certainly
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Two attempts to enforce the mandate in Allegheny County have
failed. The very next year, 1988, Philadelphia County simply
dropped court funding from its fiscal year 1988-1989 budget. In response, the court by per curiam order, directed the city and county
to resume funding. 118 A few years later, a number of counties filed
a "Motion to Enforce Judgment," which the court held did not
squarely raise the issue of enforcement. 1 9 Chief Justice Nix dis12 0
sented, arguing that the original mandate should be revoked,
while Justices Larsen and Papadakos2 argued that the mandate
1
should either be enforced or revoked. 1
What lesson should be learned from Allegheny County? That
courts should never insist on unpopular rulings? The United
States Supreme Court was the object of criticism and resistance in
its attempt to enforce Brown v. Board of Education.2 2 What if
that effort had failed? Would that decision have "come to be seen
as a blunder and symbol of judicial impotence" as one commentator observed?1 23 Or, would we view such a failure as a noble attempt to do the right thing? Perhaps there are justices on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania who feel they did the right thing in
Allegheny County. If so, the resulting debacle has nothing to teach
them.
But Allegheny County is not Brown. Allegheny County is a
squabble over money. Worse, since overall spending will be unaffected, it is a squabble over which politicians will receive credit for
lowering taxes. It was not a sufficiently important matter to press
the court's institutional powers to their limits. Allegheny County
was the perfect case to avoid a confrontation and defer to the will
the appearance is that the decision was influenced by the need of Commissioner Tom Foerster, the most powerful figure in the Allegheny County Democratic Party, to find new sources
of revenue. This political connection is enforced because, as Chief Justice Nix demonstrated
and as the reader can plainly see by reading the majority opinion, the decision is not at all
convincing on the. merits. This enormous transfer of tax responsibility and this enormous
change in prior practice is ordered merely because article V, section 1 provides that the
judicial power "shall be rested in a unified judicial system." Because all cases filed in Pennsylvania are heard by the same courts in the same way on appeal, the system could certainly
be said to be "unified" already.
118. Bradley v. Casey, Nos. 119 & 122 E.D. App. Dkt. 1988 (Pa. Dec. 1, 1988).
119. Allegheny County v. Commonwealth, 626 A.2d 492, 493 (Pa. 1993).
120. Allegheny County, 626 A.2d at 493 (Nix, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 493 (Larsen, J., joined by Papadakos, J., dissenting).
122. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown led to massive, quasi-official resistance in several
states. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation:Progress and Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 193 (1964).
123. Lino A. Graglia, The Brown Cases Revisited: Where Are They Now?, 1 BENCHMARK, Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 23, 27.
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the "Passive
of the legislature. It was the perfect case to exercise
2
Virtues" which Professor Bickel so recommended.' 4
III.

CASES OF BROAD PUBLIC IMPORTANCE

In two areas, the court has entered a tangled public policy arena
and has imposed its own vision of the way things ought to be.
Whether the court has solved a crisis or provoked one is a matter
of dispute. What is apparent in these cases is a willingness to impose impressively broad notions of policy in areas that courts are
usually loath to enter.
A. Labor Relations
125
The first case, Masloff v. Port Authority of Allegheny County,
was certainly a case decided against a backdrop of crisis. On March
16, 1992, Amalgamated Transit Union Local 85 went on strike,
thus terminating most mass transit in the City of Pittsburgh and
greatly disrupting transportation in the city. 126 For two weeks, the
city endured the strike and its dislocations. Then on March 31,
1992, the mayor of Pittsburgh, Sophie Masloff, sued to enjoin the
strike and at the same time filed an application for extraordinary
relief, requesting that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania assume
127
plenary jurisdiction over the case.
Despite the numerous allegations that have been made about
this case as the result of the investigation of Justice Larsen,12 1 the
case was fairly simple. Given the governing statutory framework,
the case should have been immediately dismissed. Prior to 1986,
employees of the Port Authority Transit ("PAT") did not have a
right to strike, but they did have a right to insist on binding arbi-

124.

Alexander M. Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961); Alexander

M. Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLMCS

(1962). Allegheny County is not the only case in which the political question doctrine would
have helped the court. Ironically, given its ultimate ruling upholding legislative action, the
court expanded judicial oversight of the legislative process in Consumer Party v. Commonwealth, 507 A.2d 323 (Pa. 1986), by overturning the well-established enrolled bill doctrine.
Consumer Party, 507 A.2d at 332-34. Under that doctrine, procedural irregularities in the
passage of legislation were not subject to judicial review. See Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401,
412 (1877). Given the embarrassing nature of the decision upholding the pay increase in
Consumer Party, the court would have been better advised to avoid deciding the merits
altogether. See notes 97 & 99-103 and accompanying text.
125. 613 A.2d 1186 (Pa. 1992).
126. Masloff, 613 A.2d at 1187.
127. Id. at 1187-88.
128. See The Lowdown on the High Courts, cited at note 1.
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tration.'2 In the 1986 amendments to the Port Authority Act, 30
employees gained the right to strike but lost the right to require
binding arbitration.' 3 ' A strike may only be ended by court order if
the court further mandates binding arbitration. 3 2 Such a lawsuit,
however, can be brought only by PAT, "[n]o party, other than the
authority, shall have any standing to seek any
relief in any court of
33
this Commonwealth under this subjection.'

The 1986 amendments created a careful balance of power between PAT and its employees. Whereas prior to the amendments a
union could force concessions from PAT by the threat of initiating
binding arbitration, always something of a gamble, especially for
the party paying the bills, under the amendments a union can
force concessions only by means of a threat to strike. PAT can end
such a strike by suing for relief, but only if it is willing to submit
the matters to binding arbitration.3 s Both sides have a certain
amount of leverage in this scenario, but neither side has total
control.
Without explanation and in the face of the statute's grant of exclusive standing to PAT, the court did not dismiss the mayor's
suit. Instead, the court assumed jurisdiction and, again without explanation, dismissed PAT's preliminary objection to the mayor's
standing to bring the case. 3 5 The court then remanded the case to
a chancellor of the commonwealth court, who ultimately enjoined
the strike but did not order binding arbitration."s6 The court, in an
opinion by Justice Zappala, subsequently affirmed the result
7
below.

11

Since the threat to public welfare is easily shown in a mass
transit strike in a major urban area,'3 " there were really two issues
before the court: first, could the city sue; and second, must binding
arbitration be ordered whenever a transit strike is enjoined?
129. Masloff, 613 A.2d at 1187.
130. 55 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 551-563 (1964 & 1993 Supp.).
131. Masloff, 613 A.2d at 1189.
132. 55 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 563.2(k) (Supp. 1993).
133. Id.
134. Id. Technically, even if it sues, PAT cannot ensure that a strike will be enjoined.
The Act requires that PAT show that the strike "creates a clear and present danger or
threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public .... " Id. As a practical matter, however, a lasting transit strike will certainly meet this standard.
135. Maslofi, 613 A.2d at 1188.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1192.
138. Justice Larsen, joined by Chief Justice Nix, did dispute this showing. Id. at 1193-
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The court held that the mayor had standing to sue because the
exclusive grant of standing to PAT, in light of the statutory recognition of the strike's harm as a basis for suit, violated the constitution's open courts provision.1 3 e In essence, under the statute, the
strike's harm remained a legal "injury," but the ability of the public to enforce a remedy for this injury had been extinguished. The
court held that it was proper not to order binding arbitration because the statute provides that only a lawsuit by PAT may trigger
14 0
a mandate of binding arbitration.
Justice Larsen's dissent is surely right in observing that the majority wanted to have it both ways.' 4 1 The sentence in the statute
that limits the right to sue is unconstitutional, but somehow, still
has enough effect to prevent binding arbitration when anyone else
sues. The remaining part of the statute, however, is quite compatible with ordering binding arbitration regardless of who sues.
In Masloff, the court took it upon itself to "solve" the transit
strike. The open courts holding was ad hoc-there is hardly any
precedent applying article I, section 11 and what there is was not
cited. Furthermore, it would seem that the reason binding arbitration was not ordered is that the justices were not sure that PAT
could afford whatever contract would have resulted.
Adjusting labor relations is not something courts are equipped to
do. Although the strike was resolved, the court has created an incentive for PAT not to bargain, and if struck, not to sue. The next
time a union is ordered by the supreme court to go back to work,
the workers may simply refuse to go. Fortunately Masloif can be
reversed by a number of legislative expedients. The easiest would
be simply to eliminate the union's right to strike once PAT invokes
binding arbitration, but not to permit anyone, including PAT, to
sue to enjoin a transit strike until binding arbitration is invoked.

139. Masloff, 613 A.2d at 1190-91. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 11. The provision states:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may
by law direct.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
140. Maslofl, 613 A.2d at 1191-92.
141. Id. at 1192 (Larsen, J., dissenting).
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Taxes

In Hospital Utilization Project ("HUP") v. Commonwealth,4 2
the court rendered a decision that threatens the non-profit industry in Pennsylvania, especially colleges and hospitals. HUP involved a non-profit corporation created by several hospitals to provide a uniform system for the collection and collation of statistical
data on area-wide hospital utilization.", 3 The court held that the

corporation was not entitled to tax exemption under article VIII,
section 2(a)(v) of the Pennsylvania Constitution.""'
The structure of the constitutional text helps to explain why
HUP was a state constitutional case at all, since at the federal level
and in most other states the granting of tax exemptions would be
purely a matter of legislative policy. 14" Article VIII, section 1 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "[a]ll taxes shall be
uniform .

"..."146

This language has been interpreted not only to

prohibit progressive taxation of income, but to require rough
equality of tax burden for all members of the class that is subject
to a tax.147 Thus, for example, exempting individuals or institutions that own property from a property tax violates uniformity. In
order to grant such exemptions, which hospitals and universities
enjoy by statute, the Pennsylvania Legislature has to have a source
of authority in the constitution.
Article VIII, section 2 gives to the legislature the authority to
craft various tax breaks. 148 For example, churches and cemeteries

may be made exempt. 49 The non-profit sector as a whole, however,
lacks such specific exemptions. The constitution only gives to the
legislature the power to exempt "[i]nstitutions of purely public
charity" from taxation.150 The HUP court decided that the Hospital Utilization Project was not such an "institution." 5 '
142. 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1985) [hereinafter HUP].
143. HUP, 487 A.2d at 1309.
144. Id. at 1317-18. Article VIII, section 2(a) states: "The General Assembly may by
law exempt from taxation . . . Institutions of purely public charity, but in the case of any
real property tax exemptions only that portion of real property of such institution which is
actually and regularly used for the purposes of the institution." PA. CONST. art. VIII,

§ 2(a)(v).
145. See generally, Roland F. Chase, Annotation, Exemption of Charitableor Educational Organization from Sales or Use Tax, 53 A.L.R. 3d 748 (1973 and Supp. 1993).
146. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
147.

See Amidon v. Kane, 279 A.2d 53,'59 (Pa. 1971).

148. PA. CONST. art. VIII,
149.

§ 2.

PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a)(i)-(iii).
PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a)(v). See note 144 for applicable text.

150.
151. HUP, 487 A.2d at 1317-18.
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HUP could have been a simple and insignificant case. Essentially, the project sold services for income, like any business. Even
by statute, the project's entitlement to a tax exemption was tenuous. The justices chose instead to write an extremely broad opinion. In retrospect, the three most significant aspects of HUP are,
first, that the court wrote a generally applicable test for determining whether an institution can be considered a "purely public charity." Second, the HUP test gives no deference whatsoever to legislative treatment of that term, no matter how reasonable or
traditional the statutory definition is. Finally, the HUP test is so
stringent that hospitals, universities, and most other institutions,
may be unable to satisfy it, and thus may be subject to all state
and local taxes in Pennsylvania.
The HUP test for a purely public charity requires the satisfaction of five factors:
[A]n entity qualifies as a purely public charity if it possesses the following
characteristics.
(a) Advances a charitable purpose;
(b) Donates or renders gratuitously a substantial portion of its
services;
(c) Benefits a substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of charity;
(d) Relieves the government of some of its burden; and
(e) Operates entirely free from private profit motive. 15'

The full meaning and application of the HUP test are still unsettled and are beyond the scope of this article. The commonwealth
court, which at one point suggested that all hospitals might not
have to satisfy the HUP test, 153 now seems to agree that any insti-

tution seeking a "charitable" tax exemption must satisfy HUP.'"
The state supreme court itself seemed to soften HUP by suggesting in G.D.L. Plaza Corporation v. Council Rock School District1 5 that compliance with prior case law would satisfy HUP as
well.1 56 As currently interpreted, however, HUP does not seem to

exempt most traditionally tax-exempt organizations. University
152. Id. at 1317.
153. School Dist. of Erie v. Hamot Medical Ctr., 602 A.2d 407, 413 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1992).
154. Board of Revision of Taxes v. American Bd. of Internal Medicine, 623 A.2d 418,
420 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993); Allentown Hospital-Lehigh Valley Hospital Ctr. v. Board of
Assessment Appeals, 611 A.2d 793 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied, 616 A.2d 986 (Pa.
1992).
155. 526 A.2d 1173 (Pa. 1987).
156. G.D.L. Plaza Corp., 526 A.2d at 1175-76.
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students, for example, probably are not "legitimate subjects of
charity"; nor do most of these institutions make "a bonafide effort
'15 7
to serve primarily those who cannot afford the usual fee.
In terms of the court's role, the precise contour that the constitutional text ultimately assumes is not important. The point is
that the supreme court should not be determining tax policy at all.
It cannot be doubted that wholly removing these tax exemptions
would be an economic shock to one sector that has helped sustain
Pennsylvania's economy while manufacturing has declined. It is
not clear, however, that hospitals, universities and research centers
would be able to compete for students, staff and resources if Pennsylvania alone taxed them fully. Whether these institutions should
be tax exempt is a matter upon which reasonable people may differ. But what is beyond dispute is that the consequences of such
taxation are serious.
In this context, in which no matters of individual right are involved and in which no unpopular minority group is harmed, the
court should apply an almost irrebuttable presumption of constitutionality to the legislature's own definitions and applications of the
"purely public charity" exemption. Instead of granting any such
presumption, however, the court treats its own view as a threshold
question before statutory definitions may even be considered. 5 8 It
is instructive to contrast the court's willingness to defer to the legislature's judgment that the death penalty is not a "cruel punishment,"1 59 an area in which fundamental rights and unpopular minorities are clearly implicated, with its unwillingness to give the
legislature any say at all in what constitutes a "purely public
charity."
Taxation is not an area in which the constitutional text is unambiguous and, thus, the court must intervene. The Kentucky Supreme Court, for example, faced with basically the same constitutional text'60 has determined that a charity "includes activities
which reasonably better the condition of mankind"16 1 and the
157. Erie v. Hamot, 602 A.2d at 414 (citing HUP, 487 A.2d at 1315 n.9). Hospitals,
universities and other non profit organizations also aggressively seek payment of all fees
even though such efforts are sometimes ineffective. Hamot, 602 A.2d at 414.
158. G.D.L Plaza Corp., 526 A.2d 1173, 1175 n.2
159. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d 937, 960 (Pa. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 970 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236 (1983) (death penalty does not violate Article I,
section 13, in part because of consistent legislative enactment).
160. Ky. CONST. § 170. Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that "institutions of purely public charity" are to be exempt from taxation.
161. Kentucky ex rel. Luckett v. I. W. Bernheim Found., 505 S.W.2d 762, 764 (Ky.
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Kentucky Court of Appeals has upheld tax exempt status for a
hospital consortium laboratory service similar to Hospital Utilization Project. " '
The Pennsylvania tax exempt status cases neither discuss precedent from other states, nor do they discuss policy or the proper
role of the courts. Instead, the opinions read like formal exercises
in definition. This formalism makes it all the easier for the court to
impose a new vision of tax policy without having to defend it. The
court should overrule or reinterpret HUP before the lower courts
begin to enforce it on a large scale. 16
Though not of the global significance of HUP, the justices have
recently announced their views of tax policy in two other cases. In
Allegheny County v. Monzo,'6" Justice Papadakos' majority opinion struck down the Hotel Room Rental Tax Statute as applied to
a Monroeville motel operator, as a "special tax which is prohibited
under Pa. Const. Art. 3, § 32.'1 65 The court found that a motel in
the "distant municipality of Monroeville Borough" derived little or
no benefit from the Pittsburgh Convention Center that the motel
tax helped to fund. 166 In the course of its decision, the justices saw
fit to express their view of the central urban hub approach to economic development.
We see no reason to restrict the benefits of the tax to Pennsylvania's only
second class county. The opportunity for development of local meeting fa-

cilities should be afforded to all of the state's smaller municipalities. The
development of civic facilities to stimulate economic growth and to promote

tourism are statewide concerns."'
In Ridley Arms, Inc. v. Township of Ridley,'6 s the court was
presented with a constitutional and statutory challenge to a garbage collection fee that was more than two times the fee of a private garbage collection business. 169 Justice Flaherty's majority
1974).
162. Department of Revenue v. Central Medical Lab., Inc., 555 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1977).
163. Most hospitals and universities in Pennsylvania appear to still retain their tax
exempt status despite HUP. It is not clear why this is so. Clearly, some municipalities, like
the City of Pittsburgh, are content to require smaller payments in lieu of taxes. But, of
course, such a procedure invites a taxpayer suit arguing that accepting smaller payments
from an institution that should not be tax exempt itself violates the tax uniformity clause.
164. 500 A.2d 1096 (Pa. 1985).
165. Monzo, 500 A.2d at 1105.
166. Id. at 1104.
167. Id. at 1106.
168. 531 A.2d 414 (Pa. 1987).
169. Ridley Arms, 531 A.2d at 417.
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opinion held that, although the plaintiff had not met its constitutional burden of proof, the tax would nevertheless be struck down
as "unreasonable" under the First Class Township Code. 170 In the
course of that holding, Justice Flaherty penned a broad attack on
excessive government spending that certainly sounded like a constitutional challenge.
.For many years now, and increasingly, taxpayers have adopted a fatalistic
view that no matter how' outrageous, how costly, how uncompetitive a government activity is, if it is sponsored by government, it is not open to successful challenge. But governmental systems and classifications which require the payment of taxes or the curtailment of freedoms were never
meant to be regarded as unchallengeable, regardless of their fairness, utility
and reasonableness. To the contrary, government in this Commonwealth
and this nation has always been conceived of as the provider of safe and
efficient service, not as a repository for exorbitant costs. If government cannot provide services at least of a quality and at a cost commensurate with
similar services provided by private enterprise, it is, by definition, unreasonable to utilize tax dollars for that purpose. That many have lost
sight of
m
that patently obvious idea is as unfortunate as it is surprising.1
1 72
Neither Monzo nor Ridley Arms is an important tax precedent.
But they do show a surprising willingness on the part of the justices to enter the tax arena, an area in which most courts defer to
the political branches of government.

IV.

CASES OF APPARENT JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST

The following cases represent issues that, unlike those in the former cases, the court could not easily sidestep. Nor in these cases
does the court necessarily impose its own view of policy. The court
does, however, issue rulings that benefit the judiciary itself. Unless
absolutely persuasive, which some of these rulings are not, such
rulings cast a cloud on the impartiality of the court.
A.

Judicial Compensation

In two cases decided in 1989, a court divided over rationale
struck down the State Employees Retirement Code of 1974,111
which eliminated certain options for retirement contribution and
increased retirement contribution rates for Pennsylvania judges
170. Id.
171. Id. at 418.
172. Indeed, the attempt to apply Monzo to the Philadelphia Convention Center
failed. Leventhal v. Philadelphia, 542 A.2d 1328 (Pa. 1988).
173. 71 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5101-5956 (1984 & Supp. 1992).
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entering service after 1974.174 In effect, the 1974 changes created
two tiers of judges in terms of compensation. 17 5
Each case contained a three-justice opinion announcing the
judgment of the court. In Goodheart v. Casey, 76 Chief Justice Nix
argued that lowering retirement benefits for judges entering the judiciary after 1974 conflicts with the court's "inherent power to determine and compel payment of those sums of money which are
reasonable and necessary" for the judicial branch to carry out its
tasks. 177 In context, total compensation for post-1974 judges was
too low to satisfy the constitution. Chief Justice Nix emphasized
that the pre-1974 system represented the legislature's own view of
adequate compensation and thus, departure from that standard
178
was by definition inadequate.
Justice Larsen's approach to the same issue was different. Along
with Justices Zappala and Papadakos, he concurred in the result in
Goodheart.79 In the companion case, Klein v. Employees' Retirement System, 80 Justice Larsen argued for these three justices that
a different retirement package for judges who joined the bench after 1974, "creates unequal, arbitrary and unreasonable classifications of judges within the same class/level which violate the equal
protection provisions of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and are in conflict with the constitutional mandate
174. See Goodheart v. Casey, 555 A.2d 1210 (Pa. 1989) and Klein v. Employees' Retirement System, 555 A.2d 1216 (Pa. 1989).
175. The 1974 Code eliminated two voluntary retirement fund contributions-Class E1 coverage and a Social Security Integration Plan-that had permitted judges to contribute
funds in excess of the basic mandatory retirement program. The 1983 amendment to the
1974 Code increased the employee contribution from 5% of gross salary to 6.25% without a
corresponding increase in benefit levels. Goodheart, 555 A.2d at 1211.
The difference in retirement income between the pre- and post- 1974 change is illustrated
in Justice Larsen's opinion in Klein v. Employees' Retirement System, 555 A.2d 1216 (Pa.
1989). Justice Larsen described two hypothetical judges, one entering the bench immediately before the change and one immediately after. The first judge would receive a maximum annual pension benefit of $66,566 per year, the second, $32,000 per year. Klein, 555
A.2d at 1218.
These numbers certainly present a stark contrast. Justice Larsen failed to note, though,
that these reduced benefits reflected, in part, reduced contributions by the second judge.
Thus, the opinion should have also reflected these contributions personally invested by the
judge, as contributing to the judge's retirement income.
176. 555 A.2d 1210 (Pa. 1989).
177. Goodheart, 555 A.2d at 1212 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274
A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1971)).
178. Goodheart, 555 A.2d at 1215.
179. Id. at 1210 (Larsen, Zappala, and Papadakos, J.J., concurring in result).
180. 555 A.2d 1216 (Pa. 1989).
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to have a unified judicial system in this Commonwealth."' 18 1
Neither of these two accounts is at all convincing. In terms of
Chief Justice Nix and passing over the whole idea that judges have
inherent power to order legislators to pay them more money, it is
not the case that the prior compensation package establishes an
absolute floor for constitutional adequacy. Perhaps the judiciary
was over-compensated before and the new scheme is now adequate. In terms of Justice Larsen, it is not arbitrary to lower compensation at one point in time because the justices themselves had
previously held that changes in compensation could not be applied
to any employees already employed when the changes were
made. 182 For the same reason, two tiers of compensation do not
violate the requirement of a "unified" system. No doubt the legislature would have preferred to lower the retirement compensation
of all the judges, but correctly assumed that the justices would not
allow it.
But even if the reader found these opinions persuasive, the issue
of the appropriateness of judicial action would remain. The appearance in Goodheart and Klein is certainly one of judges protecting their own. If that were unavoidable, that is, if the legislature had violated some unambiguous constitutional norm, the
justices might nevertheless have been justified in enjoining the
statutory changes. But, where the constitutional text is either silent or ambiguous, justices who are concerned about the appearance of self-seeking should not act. The justices did act, however,
thus contributing to the general public perception of bias in the
administration of justice.18
Unfortunately, there is a second episode of bad judicial compensation analysis, probably worse than that of the retirement cases.
1 84
The case, Consumer Party of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth,
attracted public attention because it involved a legislative pay
raise. The Public Official Compensation Law of 1983,185 the enact181. Klein, 555 A.2d at 1217 (emphasis added).
182. Association of Pennsylvania State College and Univ. Faculties v. State Sys. of
Higher Educ., 479 A.2d 962 (Pa. 1984) (1983 amendments to retirement system unconstitutional as applied to employees who were already members of the system).
183. The appearance of impropriety was strengthened with the acknowledgment upon
reconsideration that two of the justices involved in deciding these cases had a pecuniary
interest in the result. Though the recusal issue was waived, as Chief Justice Nix held, the
presence of it serves to reemphasize the self-interested nature of the entire litigation. Goodheart v. Casey, 565 A.2d 757, 761-62 (Pa. 1989).
184. 507 A.2d 323 (Pa. 1986).
185. 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 366.1-371 (Supp. 1993).
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ment of which was challenged in Consumer Party, also contained a
pay raise for the judiciary, including the justices of the supreme
court.' s
The circumstances of the enactment of this pay raise reflected
an obvious intent to circumvent the procedural requirements of
lawmaking contained in article III, sections 1-13.187 The Compensation Bill was enacted as Senate Bill 270.188 But Senate Bill 270
originally involved a reform of certain county laws, including filling
certain vacancies.1 89 That bill, by that title, was passed by the Senate on April 18, 1983, and an amended version was passed by the
House on June 1, 1983. ' 90 The two differing versions were then
sent to conference committee.' 91
On September 28, 1983, however, a totally new version of Senate
Bill 270 was submitted to the House and Senate by the conference
committee.' 92 This Senate Bill 270 had as its subject a pay raise for
public officials, including judges, legislators and executive branch
officials, with the new title reflecting the new subject.' 3
This new version of Senate Bill 270 was passed by the House
and Senate the same day it was presented-September 28, 1983,
94
and the governor signed the bill into law two days later.'
This novel procedure of taking a county vacancy bill and transforming it into a pay raise was obviously done to avoid the normal
procedures of lawmaking. Committees, readings, voting and so
186. Id. at § 366.2 (repealed 1992).
187. PA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-13.
188. Consumer Party, 507 A.2d at 325.
189. Id.

190. Id.
191. Id. at 326.
192. Id.
193. Consumer Party, 507 A.2d at 325. The old title of Senate Bill 270 was as follows:
An act amending the act of August9, 1955 (P.L. 323, No. 130), entitled 'an act relating to counties of the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth classes; amending,
revising, consolidating and changing the laws relating thereto' further providing for
the filling of vacancies in certain circumstances.

Id.
The new title, on September 28, 1983, was as follows:
An act establishing salaries and compensation of certain public officials including justices and judges of Statewide courts, judges of courts of common pleas, judge of the
Philadelphia Municipal Court, judges of the Philadelphia Traffic Court, district justices and the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the State Treasurer, the Auditor
General, the Attorney General and certain other State officers and the salary and the
salary and certain expenses of the members of the General Assembly; and repealing
certain inconsistent acts.
Id. at 326.
194. Id. at 326.
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forth take time. For a pay raise, time-during the passage of which
the talk-show hosts whip up opposition-can be fatal. Thus, the
new bill was injected into the old shell.
In a sense, there were numerous violations of article III in these
actions. The original Senate Bill 270 had certainly been "altered"
so "as to change its original purpose."' 9 5 The pay raise bill had not
been considered in committee, 196 nor had it been considered on
three different days in each house."9 "
Chief Justice Nix's opinion for the court essentially treated Senate Bill 270 as if it had been a real bill that was sent to conference
committee and emerged heavily amended, rather than treating
Senate Bill 270 as the new bill that it was. The court concluded
that, since conference committees are designed to hammer out differences, article III, section l's prohibition of material alteration
or amendment could not be applied to a bill that emerged from
such a consensus building process. 98
This concern about the conference committees rings pretty
hollow in a situation in which a totally new bill is inserted into an
old senate bill number. In fact, application of article III, section 1
to the entire lawmaking process, including the conference committee, need not interfere with any effort to hammer out consensus
because section 1 only prohibits changes in a bill's "original purpose."' 19 9 Conference committees do not make changes in the original purpose of a bill. Or, at least, the justices could interpret the
phrase "original purpose" with flexibility so as not to interfere
with such conferences or with the amendment process. The only
195. Article III, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides,"[n]o law shall be
passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so altered or amended, on its passage through
either House, as to change its original purpose. PA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
196. Article III, section 2 provides, "[n]o bill shall be considered unless referred to a
committee, printed for the use of the members and returned therefrom." PA. CONST. art. III,

§2.
197. Article III, section 4 provides:
Every bill shall be considered on three different days in each House. All amendments
made thereto shall be printed for the use of the members before the final vote is
taken on the bill and before the final vote is taken, upon written request addressed to
the presiding officer of either House by at least twenty-five per cent of the members
elected to that House, any bill shall be read at length in that House. No bill shall
become a law, unless on its final passage the vote is taken by yeas and nays, the
names of the persons voting for and against it are entered on the journal, and a majority of the members elected to each House is recorded thereon as voting in its favor.
PA. CONST. art III, § 4.
198. Consumer Party, 507 A.2d at 334. The justices also ruled that the article III,
section 4 issue-consideration on three different days-had been waived. Id. at 334 n.15.
199. PA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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context in which article III, section 1 need block legislative action
is a bad faith substitution of the very sort that occurred in Consumer Party.0°
It is not necessarily the case that the justices stretched to uphold
this law because their own pay raise would also have been rejected
had they struck the law down. And, in Consumer Party, unlike
many of the cases discussed in this article, the court was deferring
to the legislature. Nevertheless, the justices' weak justification for
not applying article III fairly to this sham legislative process does
not inspire confidence. Here, the court's very strained interpretation serves the judiciary's immediate financial interests. That sort
of situation is precisely the sort in which the justices should be
most circumspect. If a judge is going to stretch the constitutional
text, let it be to strike down the judge's pay raise rather than to
permit it.
B. Judicial Discipline and Selection
In two cases within the past five years, the justices have prevented matters affecting the courts from being placed on a statewide ballot. In Kremer v. Grant,s0 ' a unanimous court, led by Justice Papadakos, enjoined a proposed constitutional amendment
concerning judicial discipline from being placed on the ballot.20 2 In
Sprague v. Casey,0 s the justices canceled judicial elections for
both superior court and supreme court.2°
Neither of these two decisions is insupportable on the merits.
The constitutional amendment at issue in Kremer, was first ap200. Although not related to the judicial pay raise, the court's approval of the $10,000
increase in unvouchered expense allowances that applied to part of the State Senate was
even more outlandish than upholding the bill as a whole. Legislators may not receive an
increase in salary and mileage during the term in which they were elected. PA. CONST. art. II,
§ 8. Thus, State Senators elected in 1982 should simply have waited until their terms expired before obtaining the $10,000 pay increase. Because these senators were too greedy to
wait for the end of their terms, the bill was written so as to give these senators a $10,000
increase in their unvouchered expense allowance until the end of their terms. After the end
of the term, the expense account increase was to disappear and become a $10,000 increase in
salary. Chief Justice Nix wrote, "[aippellants utterly failed to make any showing that the
expense allowance is a sham." Consumer Party, 507 A.2d at 338. No showing should have
been necessary. Res ipsa loquitur.
201. 606 A.2d 433 (Pa. 1992).
202. Kremer, 606 A.2d at 439. Subsequently, such an amendment was put on the primary ballot in the spring of 1993, and was approved.
203. 550 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1988).
204. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 186.
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proved by the General Assembly on June 29, 1990.205 Article XI of
the state constitution requires that, once adopted by the General
Assembly, proposed constitutional amendments shall be published
three months before the next general election in at least two newspapers in every county. 20 6 Then the same proposed amendment
must be approved again by the legislature. 01
There was no real dispute in Kremer that the technical requirements of article XI had not been fulfilled. The secretary of the
commonwealth did not mail the required advertisements until four
days before the three month deadline. 20 8 For a variety of reasons,
only a handful of the advertisements ran by the August 6, 1990
date.2 0 9 The rest ran during the month of August, but not three
months before the election, as the constitution requires. 1 0 Thus,
although there were arguments on the other side,2 ' the court's legal analysis in blocking an eventual vote on the constitutional
amendment certainly was defensible.
But, a plausible legal position is really not enough to justify the
court's action. The amendment at issue was a toughening of judicial discipline at a time when one of the supreme court justices,
205. Kremer, 606 A.2d at 436. See Pa. J.R. 1990-1.
206. Article XI, section 1(a) of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, in part, as
follows:
Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives; and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members elected to
each House, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on their
journals with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause the same to be published three months before the next general
election, in at least two newspapers in every county in which such newspapers shall
be published; and if, in the General Assembly next afterwards chosen, such proposed
amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a majority of the members elected
to each House, the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause the same again to be
published in the manner aforesaid; and such proposed amendment or amendments
shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the State in such manner, and at such
time at least three months after being so agreed to by the two Houses, as the General
Assembly shall prescribe; and, if such amendment or amendments shall be approved
by a majority of those voting thereon, such amendment or amendments shall become
a part of the Constitution; but no amendment or amendments shall be submitted
oftener than once in five years. When two or more amendments shall be submitted
they shall be voted upon separately.
PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1(a).
207. Id. See note 206 for relevant text.
208. Kremer, 606 A.2d at 438.
209. Id. at 437-38.
210. Id. See also text of PA. CONST. art. XI, § l(a) at note 206.
211. Kremer, 606 A.2d at 438. A 1972 opinion of the attorney general (N.T. Volume
III, p. 519) supported the view that advertising during the month of August was adequate
notice. Id.
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Justice Larsen, was under investigation. Delaying the vote on the
amendment could have had the effect of retaining the old forum to
hear his case. Furthermore, as the reader can see, the court that
was so lax about article III to obtain a pay raise,212 began to vigorously and technically enforce article XI in order to block tougher
judicial discipline. This does tend to create an impression of selfinterest among the justices.
Kremer was one of those cases in which the court should have
deferred to the legislature's judgment concerning the fulfillment of
article XI's requirements, especially since the text provides that
amendments shall be presented "as the General Assembly shall
prescribe ....,,21' The amendment process is undeniably important, but more important is retaining the confidence of the people
in their control over the courts. Where constitutional amendments
are aimed at curbing perceived abuses by judges, the courts should
refrain from interference unless, of course, minority groups or fundamental rights are threatened. Neither of these conditions applied in Kremer.
The second case, Sprague v. Casey,21 ' presented a situation in
which judicial intervention was more justified than in Kremer.
There had been one vacancy in superior court and one in the supreme court and an election to fill these vacancies had been scheduled for November, 1988.216 But the constitution is not at all ambiguous about requiring that such replacement elections take place
in a "municipal" election, which is to say an election in an oddnumbered year. 2 6 The justices unanimously canceled the elections
212. See notes 184-200 and accompanying text.
213. PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1(a). See note 206 for the complete text.
214. 550 A.2d 184 (Pa. 1988).
215. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 186.
216. Article V, sections 13(a) and (b) provide as follows:
(a) Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be elected at the municipal election next preceding the commencement of their respective terms of office by the electors of the Commonwealth or the respective districts in which they are to serve.
(b) A vacancy in the office of justice, judge or justice of the peace shall be filled by
appointment by the Governor. The appointment shall be with the advice and consent
of two-thirds of the members elected to the Senate, except in the case of justices of
the peace which shall be by a majority. The person so appointed shall serve for a
term ending on the first Monday of January following the next municipal election
more than ten months after the vacancy occurs or for the remainder of the unexpired
term whichever is less, except in the case of persons selected as additional judges to
the Superior Court, where the General Assembly may stagger and fix the length of
the initial terms of such additional judges by reference to any of the first, second and
third municipal elections more than ten months after the additional judges are selected. The manner by which any additional judges are selected shall be provided by

Duquesne Law Review

444

.Vol. 32:409

and rescheduled them for November, 1989.217
No one can fault the court on the merits."' 8 And, if the case had
not involved a supreme court vacancy, no one could fault the court
at all. But here again, the potential for judicial self-seeking was
definitely present.
At the time Sprague was decided, the court had a four-justice
majority of democrats from Allegheny County. That number could
not have grown in 1988 as things stood because both majority
party candidates-Anita Brody and Allen Ertel-were from other
parts of the state. By rescheduling the election to November 1989,
the court made it possible for Ralph Cappy, a fifth democrat from
Allegheny County, to be elected to the court.
It is true that canceling the election was not enough to ensure
Justice Cappy's election. Nor could the justices confidently have
predicted that result. But, certainly, no Allegheny County democrat was going to be elected to the court in 1988. Thus, canceling
the election was the action the justices would have taken had they
been determined to add to the Western Pennsylvania dominance
on the court. For this reason, the decision in Sprague made the
justices look bad even though their decision was proper on the
merits.
There were numerous grounds in Sprague, including laches, or
even a general equitable consideration of the lateness of the lawsuit, to have permitted the court to announce the timing rule without canceling the election. In retrospect, the justices should have
done so.
V.

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

As stated at the outset, the most important role of a state supreme court is interpreting its state constitution. In this field, a
state court is free from federal oversight unless the interpretation
broaches federal rights. In this field, a court is free from direct
oversight by the legislators and even the people, except by the extraordinary process of amendment or the rare case of removal. In
the field of state constitutional law, a court has the obligation to
express the fundamental hopes of the people of its state, as these
this section for the filing of vacancies in judicial offices.
PA. CONST. art. V, §§ 13(a) & 13(b).
217. Sprague, 550 A.2d at 186.
218. Indeed, at the time this author was one of the voices calling for the court to look
into the matter of timing. See Bruce Ledewitz, Is '88 Supreme Court Election Permissible
Under Pa. Law?, 11 PA. LAW J. REP., No. 21 (May 23, 1988) at 3.
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hopes have been embodied in the state's fundamental law. This is
indeed a great responsibility.
. This author believes the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is failing to carry out its responsibility in the field of interpretation of
the state constitution. This statement does not mean that certain
decisions in particular areas are badly reasoned or otherwise unpersuasive. That will be true of any court from the perspective of
any observer. Rather, in three broad areas, the court has failed to
create a coherent context in which specific interpretations can take
place. These three areas are: approaches to interpretation, state action, and the role of judicial review in economic and social
regulation.
The failure of the court to carry out its role in these areas is
serious in its own right. This failure, however, goes further. The
careful unfolding of a constitutional tradition requires judicial patience and discipline. It requires that the justices look to the big
picture in the long run and not concentrate solely on how this or
that case comes out. In addition, it requires a genuine respect for
the historical development of precedent. If a justice believes "I am
the law," it is difficult for the justice to see his or her decisions as
links in a chain and to strive to place those decisions within a tradition. In these regards, the justices of the supreme court fail.
They fail utterly and repeatedly by reason of lack of modesty
rather than by lack of ability.
A. Approaches to State ConstitutionalInterpretation
During the 1980s, interpretation of state constitutions enjoyed
newfound interest.219 In response to this resurgence, some state
courts began to think seriously about how state constitutions ought
to be interpreted and began to communicate expectations to the
bar about how such issues were to be presented.220
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania came fairly late to this sort
of self-awareness. But in Commonwealth v. Edmunds,22 the court
finally seemed to create a framework for state constitutional development by declaring:
219.

See generally, A. E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State ConstitutionalLaw,
IN STATE CONS. L. 1 (1988).
220. See Robert F. Utter, Ensuring Principled Development of State Constitutional
Law: Responsibilities for Attorneys and Courts, 1 EMERGING ISS. IN STATE CONS. L. 217
(1988).
221. 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).

1 EMERGING ISS.
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[In each case hereafter implicating a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution, ...
litigants (are to] brief and analyze at least the following four
factors:
1) text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision;
2) history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case-law;
3) related case-law from other states;
4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local
concern,
and
applicability
within
modern
Pennsylvania
jurisprudence.""

Now, while it is true that Edmunds never promised that future
judicial opinions will actually reflect the four factors that it required, the expectation that the judges will do so is certainly a reasonable one. One ought, after Edmunds, at least see traces of the
four factors in opinions. It is also to be expected that factors
outside these four will not usually seem to provide the greatest
weight in state constitutional law development. Otherwise, why set
forth four factors?
In fact, Edmunds has not brought much coherence to judicial
opinions in the area of state constitutional development, though
for all the bar knows, Edmunds may have greatly improved briefs
and arguments presented to the courts. It is possible to pinpoint
three contexts in which the four factors could be helpful in the
future, but have not been utilized by the court.
First, although the Edmunds opinion says that its factors are to
be looked at "each time a provision of that fundamental document
is implicated,"22 Edmunds itself arises out of a particular state
constitutional law context-when the, court must decide whether to
follow a federal precedent in interpretation of a related state constitutional provision.2 24 This context may exhaust the application
of Edmunds. It may turn out that Edmunds does not apply, for
example, to the separation of power field, because there, federal
precedent usually counts for little. In two recent court funding
cases that examined the court's "inherent" power to order county
authorities to fund local courts at acceptable levels, the Edmunds'
factors played no role.22 At this point, one would not expect to see
222. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895.
223. Id. at 894-95.
224. In Edmunds, the issue was whether to follow United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984), and to adopt a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court concluded
that a good faith exception would violate article I, section 8. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 894-95.
See also notes 234-244 and accompanying text.
225. See Lavelle v. Koch, 617 A.2d 319 (Pa. 1992); Snyder v. Snyder, 620 A.2d 1133
(Pa. 1993).
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Edmunds mentioned in cases touching on institutional powers, nor
those involving state constitutional provisions that plainly lack any
federal parallel, such as the public education provision.2 26 It may
even be that Edmunds does 7not apply if federal and state provi22
sions reach the same result.
There are cases that arise in analogous circumstances to those of
Edmunds itself, but that neither cite Edmunds nor in any obvious
way take into account the Edmunds factors. For example, in Lyness v. State Board of Medicine,2 25 the justices held that the
Pennsylvania "notion" of due process was violated by the commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions within the State
Board of Medicine.2 29 Although the opinion was written by Justice
Cappy, the author of Edmunds, it did not acknowledge until a
footnote toward the end of the opinion, that one way of framing
the issue in the case would be whether the Pennsylvania courts
should follow the approach of the United States Supreme Court. 30
The same omission of Edmunds and its factors occurred in two
1991 zoning cases: Pennsylvania Northwestern Distributors,Inc.
v. Zoning Hearing Board,"5 ' in which the court, virtually alone
among the states, rejected any form of amortization of non-conforming cases; and the original historic zoning case, since reversed,
2 2
United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. Philadelphia
(United
226. Article III, section 14 provides, "[t]he General Assembly shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the
needs of the Commonwealth." PA. CONST. art. III, § 14.
227. See Commonwealth v Kohl, 615 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1992) (implied consent law an unreasonable search and seizure on independent state and federal grounds).
228. 605 A.2d 1204 (Pa. 1992).
229. Lyness, 605 A.2d 1204. Since the Pennsylvania Constitution has no due process
clause, a fact that the justices have never permitted to get in their way, all that could be
violated is our "notion" of due process. The justices need to start over in the due process
and equal protection fields-which we also lack-by taking a fresh look at the text of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.
230. Id. at 1210, 1215 n.15. Justice Cappy noted:
Appellee here relies upon the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in Withrow v.
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). In Withrow, our federal
brethren seemingly embraced a different view of due process under the United States
Constitution. However, Withrow is not binding upon this Court in determining the
meaning of the distinct due process guarantees under the Pennsylvania Constitution
and related case-law. Indeed, our decision in Dussia was handed down several months
after Withrow. Thereafter, we denied a petition for rehearing of Dussia, indicating
our high level of comfort with Pennsylvania law.
Id.
231. 584 A.2d 1372 (Pa. 1991).
232. 595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991) [hereinafter United Artists I], withdrawn and reargued,
1993 Pa. LEXIS 237, (Pa. Nov. 9, 1993) [hereinafter United Artists II]. The opinion in
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Artists I), in which the court declined to follow Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. New York City.2"'
There is nothing illegitimate in the reasoning of any of these
cases. They were simply decided by relying upon Pennsylvania
precedent. That by itself, however, is enough to indicate that the
Edmunds structure is too formal and unwieldy to apply consistently.2 34 Edmunds is perhaps more trouble than it is worth. Cer-

tainly the superior court has no business treating the failure to
brief issues in the Edmunds style as a form of waiver, 3 as if litigants could be certain just when Edmunds applies and how to use
it. The justices need to create a more flexible structure or to clarify
the application of Edmunds.
But the most surprising aspect of the Edmunds experience is
that the four factors have not banished an older conception of
state constitutional law-that the court should follow federal precedent unless there were some extremely persuasive reason not to.
This position is associated with Justice Hutchinson, who articulated it in dissent in 1983 in Commonwealth v. Sell,236 stating "absent compelling reason, textual or otherwise, I believe the interests
of this nation are best served by maintaining common standards of
''23 7
constitutional law throughout its separate jurisdictions.

Justice McDermott, dissenting in Edmunds, took the same approach, saying that "[t]he Supreme Court of the United States is a
world landmark for the protection of constitutional rights. What
they require we enforce; what they allow we ought not deter except
upon clear evidence of positive need.

' 23 8

This position of extreme deference to the United States Supreme Court, particularly insofar as it requires a textual difference
before allowing a departure from federal constitutional approaches,
should not have survived Edmunds. The four factors in Edmunds
do not in any sense defer to the United States Supreme Court's
United Artists II, by Chief Justice Nix, closely follows the four factors of Edmunds. But, by
not even mentioning the interpretive approach in Justice Larsen's earlier decision, Chief
Justice Nix failed to clarify the reach and authoritativeness of Edmunds.
233. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (upholding a historic zoning law against a "takings"
challenge).
234. Justice Papadakos has recently complained about the court's failure to take Edmunds seriously. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 614 A.2d 1378, 1384-85 (Pa. 1992)
(Papadakos, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308, 319-20 (Pa. 1992)
(Papadakos, J., dissenting).
235. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Peterfield, 609 A.2d 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
236. 470 A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983).
237. Sell, 470 A.2d at 469 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting).
238. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 909 (McDermott, J., dissenting).
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interpretation of parallel provisions nor emphasize slight variations
in text between the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions.
Nevertheless, even after Edmunds, these ideas remain as a competing conception of state constitutional adjudication. In 1985,
Justice Hutchinson was able to write his "test" into law in Commonwealth v. Gray,25 9 which adopted the "totality of the circumstances" test of Illinois v. Gates240 as the proper standard for interpretation of probable cause under article I, section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution:
While we can interpret our own constitution to afford defendants greater
protections than the federal constitution does, see, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 63-64, 470 A.2d 457, 467 (1983) (collecting cases), there
should be a compelling reason to do so. See id. at 70, 470 A.2d at 470
(Hutchinson, J., dissenting). In Chandler, supra, we already noted that the
Gates analysis appears more practical. That this is so is even more plain on
this record. Besides, there is no substantial textual difference between the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that would require us to expand the protections afforded under the federal document.2 1

Since Gray presented a competing vision of state constitutional
interpretation, the Edmunds opinion should have distinguished or
disapproved its approach. While Gray was discussed in Edmunds
for its implications for the good faith exception issue, 242 Gray's interpretative aspects were ignored. Thus Gray's language sits there,
just as authoritative as Edmunds, but representing a completely
different world view. Worse, Justice Cappy, the author of Edmunds, himself used language similar to that of Gray in his dissent
in the original United Artists opinion:
I note that the majority opinion herein does not address the holding of the
United States Supreme Court decision in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed 2d 631 (1978), but rather
focuses on the dissent. In Penn Central, the Court held, inter alia, that the
New York City Landmark's Preservation Law did not constitute a "taking"
under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution that would
require "just compensation." Although Penn Central was decided on federal
constitutional law and the majority has decided the case sub judice under
state constitutional law, I do not believe that the language of our state conmandates a different outcome on the issue of
stitution 24necessarily
8
"taking.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985).
462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Gray, 503 A.2d at 926.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 891 n.3.
United Artists 1, 595 A.2d at 14 n.1 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the court does not seem to appreciate fully the potential of
Edmunds to replace formalism in state constitutional analysis in
favor of a flexible application of other factors." The justices owe
the rest of us more care in the resolution of these methodological
issues.
B.

State Action

One of the most significant issues in American constitutional law
is state action. In terms of the federal Constitution:
The "state action" doctrine has long established that, because of their language or history, most provisions of the Constitution that protect individual
liberty-including those set forth in Art. 1, §§9 and 10, the Bill of Rights,

and the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments-impose restrictions or obligations only on government.24

The significance of the state action requirement is that without it,
individuals and entities would be subject to constitutional restrictions. Without the state action doctrine, General Motors, for example, might be bound to give procedural due process in firing an
employee. Shopping malls might be bound to permit political solicitation and so forth.
The requirement of state action to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment was declared by the United States Supreme Court in
1883.211 Although issues of the meaning of, and scope of, state action have changed and wavered since then, the need for state action has not been altered. In contrast, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not managed to state a simple rule concerning state
action. In Pennsylvania, the matter remains open.
There is early support for the proposition that state action is not
required by the Pennsylvania Constitution. In Spayd v. Ringing
Rock Lodge, s47 the court held that a union was bound by the free
244. Of course, the court could resolve the Edmunds/Gray dispute by expressly upholding Justice Hutchinson's approach. This author hopes this does not occur. One of the
problems with the Gray formula is that it tends to overemphasize what are really minor and
haphazard differences in constitutional texts. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594 A.2d
281 (Pa. 1991), which rejected closed-circuit television testimony in child abuse cases in
large part because the confrontation clause, article I, section 9, contains the phrase "face to
face" which the Sixth Amendment does not contain. Whatever one thinks of the result in
Ludwig, that textual variation is a weak basis on which to reach a result. Obviously "confront" could mean always in person while face to face could reflect a mere preference. If one
looks to textual differences, however, Ludwig is the sort of decision one is likely to get.
245. WILLIAM B. LOCKHART, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1473 (7th ed. 1991).
246. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
247. 113 A. 70 (Pa. 1921).
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expression clause in the Pennsylvania Constitution and could not
expel a worker from union activities for the expression of his ideas,
even if those ideas contradicted the legislative agenda of the
union.2,8
Spayd is a remarkable opinion, which, if applied to corporations,
would result in the protection of non-union workers from certain
forms of employer abuse. But Spayd has never been extended. It
may be that Spayd represents nineteenth century judicial hostility
against unions, and nothing more.
The most important modern Pennsylvania state action case is
Commonwealth v. Tate.s49 In Tate, Muhlenberg College, a private
institution, invited FBI Director Clarence Kelley to the campus for
a speech to which the public was invited. 6 0 When peaceful protestors showed up as well, they were arrested, charged with defiant
trespass and were convicted. 5 '
Because of the federal state action doctrine, Tate presented no
First Amendment issue at all. The protestors were on private property. Against the school the protestors had no First Amendment
rights. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in an
opinion by Justice Roberts, reversed the trespass convictions.3 2
The opinion does not make it clear whether the reversal was based
on constitutional grounds or statutory grounds. In part, the issue
in the case was whether the requirement of a permit, which would
not have been granted, could be considered a "lawful condition[ I"
for purposes of a statutory defense in the trespass statute.253 Also,
in part the issue was whether the Pennsylvania Constitution would
protect the defendants from criminal prosecution, perhaps aside
from the statutory defense. s 4 While Tate did not resolve the state
action issue, it certainly suggested that the Pennsylvania Constitution was relevant in contexts the federal constitution would not
reach.
248. Spayd, 113 A. at 72.
249. 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981).
250. Tate, 432 A.2d at 1384.
251. Id. at 1385. See also section 3505(b)(1) of the defiant trespass statute, which
reads in part, "(1) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given
by: (i) actual communication to the actor; .... " 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3503(b)(1) (1990).
252. Tate, 432 A.2d at 1387.
253. Section 3503(c)(2) of the defiant trespass statute further provides: "It is a defense
to prosecution under this section that: the premises were at the time open to members of
the public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining on the premises." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3503(c)(2) (1990).
254. Tate, 432 A.2d at 1387.
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The next case in the state action line involved article I, section
28, Pennsylvania's Equal Rights Amendment, in the context of
gender-based automobile insurance rates.255 In 1980, the superior
court, applying pure federal state action analysis, held that because the approval of such gender-based rates by the Insurance
Commissioner did not constitute state action, the rates could not
5
be challenged under article I, section 28 as sex discrimination. 1
Subsequently, the Insurance Commissioner disapproved genderbased insurance rates as "unfairly discriminatory" under section
3(d) of the Casualty and Surety Rate Regulation Act.2 57 In Hart-

ford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Commissioner,258 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Nix, upheld the Commissioner's action.25e
Like Tate, Hartford involved a mixture of constitutional and
statutory interpretation. In a sense the issue before the court was
the interpretation of the statutory phrase, "unfairly discriminatory." Nevertheless, Chief Justice Nix dismissed the relevance of
state action analysis in-broad language, seemingly applicable to all
of Pennsylvania constitutional law:
The "state action" test is applied by the courts in determining whether, in a
given case, a state's involvement in private activity is sufficient to justify the
application of a federal constitutional prohibition of state action to that
conduct. The rationale underlying the "state action" doctrine is irrelevant
to the interpretation of the scope of the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment, a state constitutional amendment adopted by the Commonwealth as
part of its own organic law. The language of that enactment, not a test used
60
to measure the extent of federal constitutional protections, is controlling2

But how is this language-of-the-enactment test to be applied? In
application to section 28, Chief Justice Nix held that the key language was "under the law. 2'"61 The under-the-law formulation defines the reach of section 28:
255. Murphy v. Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co., 422 A.2d 1097 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981). See article I, section 28 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
which provides that, "[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual. PA. CONST. art. I,
§28.
256. Murphy, 422 A.2d at 1104.
257. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542, 543-44
(Pa. 1984). See 40 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1183(d) (1992).
258. 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984).
259. Hartford, 482 A.2d at 543.
260. Id. at 549.
261. Id.
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[I]t circumscribes the conduct of state and local government entities and
officials of all levels in their formulation, interpretation and enforcement of
statutes, regulations, ordinances and other legislation as well as decisional
law. The decision of the Commissioner in a matter brought pursuant to the
Rate Act is not only "under the law" but also, to the extent his adjudication
is precedent on the question decided, "the law." The Commissioner, as a
public official charged with the execution of the Rate Act and sworn to uphold the Constitution and laws of this Commonwealth, Pa.Const.Art. 6, §3;
Act of June 4, 1879, P.L. 99, §1, 71 P.S. §761 (1962), was constrained to
conform his analysis of Hartford's rate plan and his interpretation of section 3(d) of the Rate Act to Article I, section 28.261

Chief Justice Nix's broad language was later relied upon by the
commonwealth court to strike down the legislature's attempt to
amend the Rate Act to allow gender discrimination. 6 3
The Hartford opinion could have represented a new approach to
the issue of the amenability of private persons and entities to constitutional control. Hartford seemed to settle the state action issue
as a general matter and suggested a provision-by-provision analysis, depending on the constitutional text.
Unfortunately, just two years later in Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Correctional General Life Insurance Co.,21 6 the court muddied the state action issue, neither
repudiating Hartford, nor accepting it. In Socialist Workers, a
fractured court affirmed the denial of injunctive relief to political
campaign workers who sought to force the owners of a shopping
mall to open the mall to their peaceful political petitioning.26 5 The
lead opinion was written by Justice Hutchinson, joined by Justice
Flaherty. 6 6 Justice Hutchinson reaffirmed Tate, but distinguished
it on the ground that the college in Tate had opened its premises
to the public for what amounted to political purposes, whereas the

mall owner had not done

so.267

Chief Justice Nix would have reaf-

firmed Tate more vigorously. 268 Justices Larsen, Zappala and McDermott, concurring in the result, all criticized, or would have reversed, Tate.2 69
Basically, Justices Larsen, Zappala and McDermott were calling
262. Id.
263. Bartholomew v. Foster, 541 A.2d 393 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), aff'd. by an equally
divided court, 563 A.2d 1390 (Pa. 1989).
264. 515 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1986).
265. Socialist Workers, 515 A.2d at 1332-33.
266. As they had joined in concurring in Hartford. See Hartford, 482 A.2d at 550-51.
267. Socialist Workers, 515 A.2d at 1336-37.
268. Id. at 1342 (Nix, J., concurring and dissenting).
269. Id. at 1340-41.
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for a regime of protection for private property and choices. This
was similar to Justices McDermott and Zappala dissenting in
Hartford. In retrospect, Justice Larsen, by changing sides in Socialist Workers, moved the court back toward a state action
requirement.
Because only Chief Justice Nix actually mentioned Hartford, it
is pure speculation whether Socialist Workers is a case about a
mall for justices sentimental about retailers or a general retreat on
the state action issue. Possibly, given the presence of state officials
in both Tate and Hartford and their absence in Socialist Workers,
the court is looking for some state involvement, even if it is less
than that necessary to trigger a federal state action analysis.
The question in terms of our evaluation of the court is, why have
these issues not been addressed in a comprehensive way? The justices have an obligation to acknowledge precedent and to explain
their later votes in terms of prior case law..They have a responsibility to participate in a tradition of judicial review that does more
than decide the issue of the day.
C.

The Court's Role in Pennsylvania Economic Life

The last methodological area reflecting the court's inability to
sustain consistent constitutional interpretation concerns the
court's role in Pennsylvania's economic life. This area includes
zoning and taxes in particular, and due process and equal protection in general. In the Edmunds line of cases, an underlying issue
is whether the court will follow federal precedent. The court has
wavered on this point. But more fundamentally, the justices must
decide on the degree to .which they will interfere with legislative
choices in this area. Thus far, the court has not advanced a convincing justification for an activist role.
Since the late 1930's, the United States Supreme Court has essentially deferred to the political judgments of legislatures, by refusing to use due process and equal protection to overturn regulations of business and other social and economic laws. 7 0 In terms of
federal review of substantive economic rights, "[t]he judiciary has
abdicated the field. 27 1 This great deference extends to review of
270. See e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding state created monopoly for lawyers in field of department adjustment).
271. Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34, 38.
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tax policy as Well.2" 2
The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment2 7 does
still provide a basis for some limits on government regulation of
economic interest. The last federal substantive due process case in
1937 was in form a just compensation case.1 7 But despite the potential of the Takings Clause to enhance judicial review of economic regulation, the United States Supreme Court has remained
extremely deferential, upholding gross restrictions on the rights of
property owners without compensation 75 and holding economic
regulation to be a compensatory taking when the regulation has
reduced the value of the property essentially to zero. 276 This approach may change, but at the moment remains the rule.2 77
In this context, a state court has only two choices: to follow federal law and abdicate review of economic policy or to make its own
way. The latter course reflects a minority of states.27 Reasonable
people can certainly differ on the extent to which courts ought to
be involved in this field. At the very least, a state court has the
responsibility of acknowledging the trend of federal law and giving
an account of why the different approach it is embracing is
preferable.
Justice Roberts wrote in this way in two cases that could have
set the trend in subsequent Pennsylvania development. In Penn2 79
sylvania State Board of Pharmacy v. Pastor,
Justice Roberts'
majority opinion acknowledged the trend in federal constitutional
law but argued that state courts could legitimately take a more as272. See e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S.Ct. 2326 (1992) (upholding California's "acquisition value" system for property assessment because there is a "plausible policy reason"
for the resulting dramatic disparities in taxation of properties of comparable value).
273. "[N]or shall private property be taken for a public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
274. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
275. See e.g. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (upholding historic zoning) and Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (upholding
rent control).
276. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); cf. Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
277. The United States Supreme Court is much more protective of property rights
when even a limited form of physical invasion occurs. See Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (requirement of a public easement is a taking).
278. See generally Monrad G. Paulsen, The Persistenceof Substantive Due Process in
the States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 92 (1950); John A. C. Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U. L. REv. 13 (1958). Two more recent
cases are Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Nebraska Dairy Products Bd., 219 N.W.2d 214 (Neb. 1974)
and Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989).
279. 272 A.2d 487 (Pa. 1971).
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sertive role in substantive due process review:
Our adjudication begins with an acknowledgement that the day has long
passed when the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could
be used to indiscriminately strike down state economic regulatory statutes.
While this test may mean that in the federal courts the "due process barrier to substantive legislation as to economic matters has been in effect removed," the same cannot be said with respect to state courts and state constitutional law. This difference between federal and state constitutional law
represents a sound development, one which takes into account the fact that
state courts may be in a better position to review local economic legislation
than the Supreme Court. State courts, since their precedents are not of national authority, may better adapt their decisions to local economic conditions and needs. And where an industry is of basic importance to the economy of a state or territory, extraordinary regulations may be necessary and
proper.218

Similarly, in the seminal tax uniformity case, Amidon v. Kane, 81
Justice Roberts' majority opinion struck down the prevailing
Pennsylvania Income Tax statute as a violation of the tax uniformity clause.28 2 While Justice Roberts did not actually distinguish
federal equal protection and due process in applying uniformity, it
was obvious that Pennsylvania uniformity demands a different
analysis because the flaw in Amidon was that the tax utilized fed2 83
eral exemptions and deductions prohibited by Pennsylvania law.
In addition, Justice Roberts cited no federal precedents in his
reasoning.
In 1991, Justice Larsen also achieved what appeared to be a
comprehensive view of judicial protection of property rights in zoning. In a pair of zoning cases, Pennsylvania Northwestern Distributors, Inc. v. Zoning HearingBoard2 84 and United Artists Theater
Circuit, Inc. v. Philadelphia,85 since withdrawn, Justice Larsen
strongly endorsed the rights of private property owners. In Northwestern Distributors, which held amortization of nonconforming
uses to be "per se confiscatory," Justice Larsen pointed out that
the use of private property is protected by article I, section 1 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.2

8

His description of the police power

280. Pastor, 272 A.2d at 490 (footnote and citations omitted).
281. 279 A.2d 53 (Pa. 1971).
282. Amidon, 279 A.2d at 54.
283. Article VIII, section 1 provides, "[a]ll taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class
of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied
and collected under general laws." PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
284. 584 A.2d 1372 (Pa. 1991). See note 231.
285. 595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991). See note 232.
286. Northwestern Distributors, 584 A.2d at 1376.
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was quite far from federal rational basis review: "In this Commonwealth, all property is held in subordination to the right of its reasonable regulation by the government, which regulation is clearly
necessary to preserve the health, safety, morals, or general welfare
'87
of the people.
In United Artists I, which struck down Philadelphia's historic
zoning ordinance, Justice Larsen wrote: "'A man's home and property used to be his castle.' Because one's property was built in a
certain architectural style or designed by a particular architect
does not make it any less his castle." ' Justice Larsen further
stated, in contradiction to article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution that zoning in pursuit of aesthetic values "could...
'2 8 9
never constitute an exercise of the police power.
Whatever one thinks of these decisions on the merits, Justice
Larsen seems to understand very well that he is writing out of a
Pennsylvania tradition different from that of federal law. Justice
Larsen acknowledged that many jurisdictions permit amortization2 90 and cited a dissenting United States Supreme Court opinion in United Artists J.291 Thus, he and the rest of the justices
must have been aware that they were going their own way. This
clarity of vision could have served as a basis for further doctrinal
development.
But these opinions have been undermined without being overruled, so that there is no way to tell what relationship Pennsylvania law has to federal law. Justice Larsen himself committed the
egregious error of quoting from the Pastor opinion and then implying that due process and equal protection analysis are the same
under Pennsylvania and federal law.292 Of course, this was precisely and expressly the opposite of what Justice Roberts had said
298 Justice Larsen's purported
in Pastor.
state standard actually was
not even the proper federal standard.2 4
287. Id. at 1374. See also Anstine v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 190 A.2d 712 (Pa.
1963).
288. United Artists 1, 595 A.2d at 13. (citation omitted).
289. Id. at 12 (citing Medinger Appeal, 104 A.2d 118, 122 (Pa. 1954)).
290. Northwestern Distributors,584 A.2d at 1374.
291. United Artists I, 595 A.2d at 13 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York,
438 U.S. 104, 152 (1978)).
292. Hayes v. Erie Ins. Exch., 425 A.2d 419, 421-22 (Pa. 1981).
293. Pastor, 272 A.2d at 490. Inexplicably, Justice Roberts joined the Hayes opinion
without comment. Hayes, 425 A.2d at 420.
294. Compare the language in Hayes with the language approved the previous year in
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980).
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In terms of taxation, the court has now repeatedly stated that
uniformity and federal equal protection analysis are alike, despite
the implication to the contrary in Amidon.295 The justices seem
completely oblivious to the fact that if uniformity really were the
same as equal protection, Amidon would have to be overruled and
a progressive state income tax-the great shibboleth of Pennsylvania politics-would be constitutional.
What happened to Justice Roberts' Pastoropinion is characteristic of analysis under the Pennsylvania constitution. The court
has often stated or implied that federal equal protection and state
"equal protection" are identical,29 6 but the results do not always
follow federal law.29 7
The best example of the court's inability to formulate a simple
and consistent starting point in the field of review of economic regulation is United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. Philadelphia
("United Artists II"1),29s which replaced Justice Larsen's first opinion. It is embarrassing that the court repudiated its decision of just
two years before, as if the first decision had been an oversight. But,
far worse, Chief Justice Nix did not simply reach a different conclusion, his opinion bears no relationship to that of Justice Larsen.
They share no starting point; there are no common analytic principles; the conclusions are completely different. All of this was done
in silence, as if Justice Larsen's opinion had been quite proper at
the time, but now the court must start over.
United Artists II actually fails more fundamentally than did the
first opinion. Justice Larsen spoke out of a coherent Pennsylvania
tradition. United Artists II, in contrast, overturned the first opinion but without presenting an alternative view of property and
government that the courts are now expected to follow. 29 9 No one
295. Amidon, 279 A.2d at 58-59. See e.g., Allegheny County v. Monzo, 500 A.2d 1096,
1102 (Pa. 1985); Leventhal v. Philadelphia, 542 A.2d 1328, 1331 (Pa. 1988); Leonard v.
Thornburgh, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Pa. 1985).
296. See James v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 477 A.2d 1302, 1305-06
(Pa. 1984). The James formulation actually does not seem to be an accurate summary of
federal case law.
297. For example, in Monzo, which states that federal and state law are the same, a
motel tax was struck down that obviously would satisfy the federal national basis test.
Monzo, 500 A.2d at 1096. See notes 164-67 and accompanying text. In Klein, the plurality
struck down an obviously "rational" judicial compensation plan on the authority of James,
which itself purports to represent federal law. Klein, 555 A.2d at 1224-25. See notes 180-181
and accompanying text.
298. No. 48 E.D. Appeal Docket 1990, 1993 Pa. LEXIS 237 (Pa. Dec. 10, 1993).
299. Chief Justice Nix did state in United Artists H that article I, section 1 does not
grant more protection to private property than does the Federal Constitution. Id. at *23.
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knows, for example, if Northwestern Distributors has been over
turned as well. Logically, since both decisions rested on a particular way of looking at property, they should fall together. But there
is no indication that the justices are looking at things this way.
The court has been unable to define its role consistently. The
justices have not shown the vision that defines a successful court.
Unfortunately the idea of a craft of judging to which judges must
conform is itself alien to the justices.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has been under intense attack this year. That attack has centered on the personal behavior
of some of the justices, the way the court is run, the way the justices are selected and the way they are disciplined. These issues
are certainly important. But it is also important to ask, how good
or bad a court is it? How well do the justices do their jobs?
No one article could evaluate the recent work product of a state
supreme court. This article has not attempted even an exhaustive
evaluation of the court's work in the field of state constitutional
law. Rather, this article has looked at cases dealing with the way
the court views its own institutional authority, including the
court's responsibility for creating a coherent constitutional
tradition.
The picture that emerges is not a good one. The court is too
ready to rely on its authority and too hesitant to defer to other
branches of government. The court also does not perform well in
the area of state constitutional interpretation, where its role is
unique.
This article does not suggest possible reforms. What reforms
could cause the justices to look at their role in a new way? It would
have helped, however, if the state constitution had not exacerbated
the problem of institutional power by granting the court broad
powers in 1968. At the very least, article V, section 10 of the state
constitution should be repealed-to be replaced by the simple
statement:
The Supreme Court shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as
may be imposed by law.
This statement could serve as the foundation of a limited role for judicial review in the
economic field. But Chief Justice Nix said nothing about prior case law that held differently,
including the 1991 zoning case closely related to United Artist I, Northwestern Distributors. See notes 284-291 and accompanying text. If United Artists II is meant to be a com-

plete starting over, the court will have to say so.

